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PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY: AN INDIAN
RESERVE AND A CANADIAN CITY
DOUGLAS C. HARRIS'

I. PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY
Property rights, wrote Morris Cohen in 1927, are not about things, but
about relations "between the owner and other individuals in reference to
things.", The law of property constructs a particular set of relationships
between people, and, in the case of private property, he continued, its
"essence" is "always the right to exclude".2 This right, enforceable by the
state, confers power on its holder-"the owner"-over others. As a result,
state allotted property interests, which arise from the exercise of state
sovereignty, are also delegations of power, of sovereignty. Cohen insisted,
therefore, that "property and sovereignty" were to be understood together,
and not confined to different spheres of private and public law. His point
was not that sovereignty, as the term is used in international law to
t
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demarcate absolute or final political authority, was meaningless. Rather, by
appropriating the concept that has come to designate statehood, Cohen
sought to reveal the public foundations of private power and then to
demand justifications for that grant of power.
Sixty years later, Joseph Singer borrowed Cohen's conceptual framing in
a critical review of developments in American Indian law. Turning his
attention to the decisions of the US Supreme Court involving territorial
and jurisdictional issues of American Indian tribes, Singer concluded that
the Court "has maintained a fundamental disjunction between legal
treatment of Indian and non-Indian property" to the detriment of Indian
nations and individual tribal members.4 Where the Court had the
opportunity to label an American Indian interest as either a sovereign
interest or a property interest, it invariably chose to the disadvantage of the
Indians: "When tribes would benefit from being classified as property
holders, the courts often treat them as sovereigns."' And where it might
benefit them to be classified as sovereigns with the capacity to exercise
political power over a defined territory, "the Court often
conceptualizes tribes as private associations."6 In short, "the Supreme
Court had manipulated the public/private distinction as it applies to tribes
in a way that has given tribal governments the worst of both
worlds"-weak property interests in comparison to other property
owners and circumscribed sovereignty when compared with other
political communities.7

Joseph William Singer, "Sovereignty and Property" (1991) 86:1 NwUL Rev 1 [Singer,
"Sovereignty and Property"].

Ibid at 3.
6

7

Ibid at 6.
Ibid.
Ibid. See also Joseph William Singer, "The Indian States of America: Parallel Universes
and Overlapping Sovereignty" (2013) 38:1 Am Indian L Rev 1; Jessica A Shoemaker,
"Complexity's Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty, and the Future" (2017)
115:4 Mich L Rev 487.
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Within Canada, Indigenous peoples have struggled to have their
interests recognized as property rights, let alone as sovereign power.' In the
nineteenth century, the Privy Council branded Indian title as a "personal
and usufructuary right, dependent on the good will of the Sovereign."9 It
was not until the 1990s, following the placement in 1982 ofAboriginal and
treaty rights in the Constitution,10 that the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) described Aboriginal title as a sui generis property interest: "sui
generisin order to distinguish it from'normal' proprietary interests, such as
the fee simple."" Long confined to the political sidelines and largely
unenforceable in the courts, Aboriginal title now had a justiciable presence
and a constitutional status. The courts also expanded the protections for
Indian reserves, imposing a fiduciary duty on the Crown in its dealingwith
reserve land.,, Moreover, the suigenerischaracter ofAboriginal title,which
also underlay the Crown's fiduciary duty," created space for the SCC to
14
import "the aboriginal perspective on land" into its definition and scope.
Aboriginal title, as a property interest, would not be defined by common
law principles alone. However, "the aboriginal perspective" was to aid in the
delineation ofAboriginal title as a property interest within the framework
of Canadian sovereignty. John Borrows describes the SCC's

8

9

10

1 use

"Indigenous peoples" when referring generally to first peoples, "Aboriginal" when
referring to the rights secured in the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the
CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 35 [ConstitutionAct, 1982], and "Indian reserve"
or "Indian band" when referring to the legal category as constructed in the Indian Act,
RSC 1985, c I-5 [IndianAct, 1985].
St Catherine'sMilling and Lumber Co vR (1888), 14 App Cas 46 at 54,4 Cart BNA
107 [St Catherine'sMilling].
Constitution Act, 1982, supranote 8, s 35.

"

Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 66 BCLR (3d) 285
[Delgamuukw] at para 112. The literature on Delgamuukw is vast, but for an early
interpretation of the implications of describing Aboriginal title as a sui generisproperty
interest seeJohn Borrows & Leonard I Rotman, "The Sui GenerisNatureofAboriginal
Title: Does It Make a Difference?" (1997-98) 36:1 Alta L Rev 9.

"

Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335, 59 BCLR 301 [Guerin].

13

Ibidat 382.

14

Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 147.
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characterization ofAboriginal title-"a burden on the Crown's underlying
title"-as "Sovereignty's Alchemy" for the manner in which it conjures
Canada's interest as the jurisdictional bedrock on which Indigenous peoples
must establish their property rights.II How is it, Burrows asks, that the SCC
accepts Canada's assertion of sovereignty while compelling Indigenous
peoples to prove they have property interests in lands they have possessed
for centuries?16
THE KITSILANO INDIAN RESERVE

In December 2009, just weeks before the Winter Olympic Games
descended on the City ofVancouver ("City"), a massive steel pole appeared
beside the Burrard Street Bridge, one of the principal entrances to the
downtown core. It supported two enormous electronic billboards that
displayed a flickering array of advertising messages to passing traffic. The
first messages presented images ofthe Squamish Nation (Figure 1), but they
were soon replaced with commercial advertising. Several years earlier, a
much more modest wooden pole had appeared near the foundations ofthe
same bridge, visible to walkers and cyclists passing under the bridge on a
pedestrian seawall and to boaters entering or leaving the small inlet. It was
carved in the shape of an oversized figure with smiling face and
outstretched arms (Figure 2). Both poles, one demanding the attention of
bridge traffic, the other tucked away almost under the bridge and bearing a
demeanour ofgreeting, announced the presence ofSquamish Nation in the
heart ofthe Province's largest and Canada's third largest metropolitan area.
15

John

'6

Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy", supranote 15 at 558.

Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia" 37:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 537 [Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy"];
Delgamuukw, supranote 11 ("Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown's underlying
title"at para 145); R vSparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075,46 BCLR (2d) 1 ("there was from
the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the
underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown" at 1103); Mark D Walters,
"'Looking for a knot in the bulrush': Reflections on Law, Sovereignty, and Aboriginal
Rights" in Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds, From Recognition to
Reconciliation:Essays on the ConstitutionalEntrenchmentofAboriginal and Treaty
Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) 35 (reviews the continuing
resonance of these passages in Canadian jurisprudence).
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Figure 1 The electronic billboard on the Kitsilano Reserve, looming over a fleet of
cars from the 2010 Olympic Games, and announcing the return of the Squamish
Nation to those crossing the Burrard Street Bridge. (Photo credit: Noah Bloom,
used with permission)

Figure 2 Squamish Nation Welcome Figure surveying False Creek and a portion
of downtown Vancouver from the Kitsilano Indian Reserve and the site of the
Coast Salish village known to the Squamish as Sen':.kw and to the Musqueam as
san'a?qw. The Squamish erected the figure, which was carved by Darren Yelton, in
2006. (Photo credit: The author)
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The wooden pole and the events that led to it were hardly noticed by
the residents of the City. In 2002, a unanimous five-judge panel of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial court
that approximately 10.5 acres ofland, which the Canadian Pacific Railway
(CPR) had taken out of Squamish Indian Reserve No. 6 (Kitsilano), should
again be Indian reserve. 7 The decision received little attention; the raising
of the wooden pole, almost none. Notoriety would come when the
Squamish, now in possession of the reserve, erected the billboards. In a city,
indeed a province, where billboards are strictly controlled, this new and
prominent advertising provoked considerable local concern.
This article draws primarily on the archival records of the Department
of Indian Affairs and the City of Vancouver to recount the appearance,
disappearance, and reappearance of the Kitsilano Indian reserve. Allotted
by the colony ofBritish Columbia in the 1860s and then expanded in 1876
after the colony joined the Canadian confederation, the Kitsilano Reserve is
one of more than 1500 reserves scattered over the Province of British
Columbia. Part II of this article describes the setting aside of the Kitsilano
Reserve for a group that Indian Affairs labelled the False Creek Indian
Band, and situates it within the processes that constructed a province-wide
Indian reserve geography. Once established, the Kitsilano Reserve became a
target for various elements within a settler society that sought either to
acquire the land for industrial purposes or, in the case of the City of
Vancouver, to create a park. Part III focuses on the CPR's taking of two
parcels from the reserve and on the statutory framework that made this
possible. Part IV then turns to subsequent challenges to the reserve status,
including the Province's attempt to buy the reserve directly from the
members of the False Creek Indian Band, the City's lobbying to be given
the land for a park, and the piece-meal dismemberment until 1947 when
the federal government accepted the Squamish surrender ofwhat remained.
Finally, Part V considers the litigation that would eventually lead to the
return of Indian reserve status for the 10.5 acres acquired by the CPR, and

"

Canada (AG) v Canadian Pacific Ltd, 2002 BCCA 478, 217 DLR (4th) 83 [CP
BCCA], affg 2000 BCSC 933,79 BCLR (3d) 62. The reserve is sometimes referred to
as the False Creek Reserve.
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reflects on the increasing robustness of the reserve as a delegation of
sovereign power in a context where the issue of Aboriginal title or, more
broadly, of sovereignty, remains unresolved.
Most of the archival records in this narrative were introduced as
evidence in either the litigation over the CPR lands," or in separate but
concurrent litigation in the Federal Court addressing claims that the federal
government had breached its fiduciary duties to the Squamish, Musqueam,
and Tsleil-Waututh Nations in its dealings with the reserve. 9 I have used the
historical records as collected and organized by the litigating parties and
then introduced to the courts. I augmented that material with additional
archival research, although not, I suspect, treading ground that was not also
covered by the researchers and lawyers. I have also used the decisions
themselves, each ofwhich contains a historical narrative about the reserve.
However, I have not relied on the historical findings in those decisions.
After a preliminary read of the judgments, I set them aside, immersed
myself in the historical documents, and wrote the account of the reserve
that follows. Only then did I return to the decisions, although principally as
elements in the historical narrative rather than as sources for the earlier
history of the reserve.
In writing the history of the Kitsilano Reserve as a property interest, I
return to the concepts of property and sovereignty, and to Cohen's
insistence on the connections between them, to reveal the nature and extent
of this particular delegation of state power. Indian reserves are a form of
property, but describing them as delegations ofsovereignty will be jarring to
those who preserve "sovereignty" to describe the character and nature of
public power as distinct from private power.2 0 Cohen described property
rights as delegations of sovereignty to emphasize the public assignment of
power that undergirds private interests. In doing so, he extended the work

11
9
20

Ibid.

Marhiasv The Queen, 2001 FCT 480,207 FTR 1 [Mathias].
For a critique from a public law scholar, see Martin Loughlin, The Idea ofPublic Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 76-79. From private law, see Arthur
Ripstein, "Property and Sovereignty: How to Tell the Difference" (2017) 18 Theor Inq
L [forthcoming].
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of his contemporary, Harold Laski, who sought to reclaim the notion of
sovereignty from international law and use it to describe multiple locations
of allegiance and political authority within states.21 Laski deployed the
language of sovereignty within constitutional law as part of his case for
federal rather than central states. Cohen pushed sovereignty further into
private law in order to make explicit the political choices in the recognition
of property rights. One might instead describe property rights as
delegations of power rather than sovereignty to avoid the censure of
scholars who insist there are important conceptual distinctions that are lost
in the blurring ofpublic and private realms. Here, I follow Cohen who used
sovereignty deliberately to emphasize the publicness, or the public origins,
of private power distributed through property rights.
Characterizing Indian reserves as delegations of state power, of
sovereignty, may also be controversial given that Indigenous peoples
inhabited and governed the territory in which the reserves were created
long before the colonial state asserted its sovereignty.2 2 Indigenous peoples
claim inherent political authority, not delegated power over their
traditional territories. Some Indigenous scholars, Taiaiake Alfred
prominent among them, are suspicious of and reject the language of
sovereignty. Alfred labels sovereignty "inappropriate as a political objective
for indigenous peoples",13 and seeks a "post-sovereign future" that is more
fully post-colonial than anything that might be imagined within the state
structures of governance that, he argues, sovereignty presumes.2 4 However,
2'

HaroldJ Laski, The FoundationofSovereigntyand OtherEssays(New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1921). See Peter Oliver, "Sovereignty in the Twenty-First Century" (2003) 14:1
King's College LJ 137 (on the inward and outward looking perspectives of sovereignty
at 138).

22

See Kent McNeil, "Factual and Legal Sovereignty in North America: Indigenous
Realities and Euro-American Pretentions" in Julie Evans et al, eds, Sovereignty:
FrontiersofPossibility(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012) 37.
Taiaiake Alfred, "Sovereignty" in Joanne Barker, ed, Sovereignty Matters: Locationsof

23

ContestationandPossibilityin Indigenous Struggles for Self-determination (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 33 at 38.
24

Ibidat41. SeeJeremy Webber, "We Are Still in the Age of Encounter: Section 35 and a
Canada Beyond Sovereignty" in Macklem & Sanderson, supra note 15 at 63 (who
describes different meanings of "sovereignty" and argues the concept is "inescapable"
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whether or not sovereignty is a useful concept for Indigenous peoples in the
project ofdecolonization, Canadian courts have not taken the preliminary
step of interrogating the historical legitimacy of European and then
Canadian claims to sovereignty."5 The SCC has gestured tentatively towards
the issue, but has not addressed it directly, let alone resolved it, 6 even in
Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbiawhere the Court for the first time
recognized a specific territory as Aboriginal title lands.27
However, while developments in the law of Aboriginal title have
certainly affected the character of Indian reserves as property interests,
Indian reserves are not Aboriginal title lands.28 Indeed, the Kitsilano
2

25

26

27

and more malleable than Alfred suggests). See also Patrick Macklem, Indigenous
Difference and the Constitution of Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2001) at 112.
Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy", supranote 15; John Borrows, Recovering Canada:
The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at
111-37; Brian Slattery, "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims" (1991) 29:4
Osgoode Hall LJ 681 at 681-703; Michael Asch & Patrick Macklen, "Aboriginal
Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow" (1991) 29:2 Alta L Rev
498; Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial
Sovereignty"' (1997) 5:2 Tulsa J Comp & Int'l L 253 at 291-98.
Mark D Walters, "The Morality of Aboriginal Law" (2005) 31 Queen's LJ 470 at
500-516 (reviews the treatment of Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty in Canadian
courts, andsuggests a shift in the courts, following Delgamuukw, away from an
unquestioning acceptance of Crown sovereignty, towards the view that, "without
aboriginal consent obtained by treaty.. .Crown sovereignty is at best a factualreality,not
a legal one" at 515 [emphasis in the original]). See also Brian Slattery, "Aboriginal
Rights and the Honour of the Crown" (2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 433; Felix Hoehn,
Reconciling Sovereignties: AboriginalNarions and Canada(Saskatoon: Native Law
Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 2012).
TsiLhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257. See
John Borrows, "The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqotin v British Columbia
(2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 701; Gordon Christie, "Who Makes Decisions over
Aboriginal Title Lands?" (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 743; Felix Hoehn, "Back to the
Future-Reconciliation and Indigenous Sovereignty after Tsilhqor'in" (2016) 67
UNBLJ 109.

2

In Guerin, Justice Dickson indicated that "the Indian interest in the land is the same in
both [Aboriginal title and Indian reserves] cases": supra note 12 at 379. This was a
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Reserve is part of an Indian reserve geography that successive governments
in British Columbia imposed on Indigenous peoples. With few exceptions,
these reserves were not the product of treaty-making or other agreement
between peoples to establish terms under which sovereignty might be
shared, but instead were state-constructed property interests within a land
policy designed to impose territorial constraints on the Indigenous
presence. 9 Indian reserves in British Columbia were the state's begrudging
concession of property rights to the prior territorial and jurisdictional
claims of Indigenous peoples. Describing Indian reserves as delegations of
sovereignty reveals them as state-constructed property interests, but using
the language of sovereignty provokes an important reminder that the
attribution of sovereign power between Indigenous peoples and state in
British Columbia remains mostly unresolved. Indian reserves, as property
interests, are delegations of sovereignty in a context where sovereignty
remains contested.
I was also drawn to the notion of sovereignty in writing a history of the
Kitsilano Reserve because Indian reserve status has sovereign effects within
Canadian federalism. The Canadian Constitution lists "Property and Civil
Rights in the Province" as the domain ofeach province.o As a consequence,
the regulation of land use, including rules such as those restricting
billboards, falls to the provinces. However, Indian reserves are exceptions.
"Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" fall within the enumerated
powers of the federal parliament,31 and although the Indian Act provides
that provincial laws of general application will apply on reserve land,2 the
courts have indicated that this does not include regulating land use on
2

29

questionable characterization at the time, and after Delgamuukw, supra note 11, and
Tsilhqor'in,supranote 27, is certainly no longer accurate.
See Richard H Bartlett, Indian Reserves and AboriginalLandsinCanada:AHomeland
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1990) at 94.

30

3

32

ConstitutionAct, 1867(UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II,
No 5, s 92(13) [ConstitutionAct].

Ibid, s 91(24).
Indian Act, 1985, supranote 8, s 88.
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reserves." Indian reserves are not federal enclaves,34 but the sovereign effect
of Indian reserve status within Canadian federalism is a partial shift of
jurisdiction over territory from the provinces to the federal government
and, under the IndianAct, to Indian bands.,, Similarly, cities, which derive
their legal status from the provinces, 6 do not have authority to exercise their
most significant law-makingpower-the regulation ofland use-on Indian
reserves. 7 It is this absence of municipal power, as much as the desire for a
particular land use, which animated the City of Vancouver's efforts to
acquire the Kitsilano Reserve and, following the ruling of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in 2002, placed 10.5 acres beyond the
City limits.,,
This focus on property and sovereignty does not preclude the usefulness
of other concepts, perhaps that of jurisdiction in particular. Jurisdiction
connotes legal decision-making authority over a defined territory, and does
so without the limitations of "property," which suggests a private realm, or
the expansiveness of "sovereignty," which signifies final political authority
and statehood in international law." While the concept of jurisdiction is

3

Douglas Saunders, "The Constitution, the Provinces, and Aboriginal Peoples" in J
Anthony Long& Menno Boldt, eds, Governmentsin Conflict?: Provincesand Indian
Nationsin Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 151 at 155.

3

CardinalvAlberta (AG), [1974] SCR 695,40 DLR (3d) 553.

35

Indian Act, 1985, supranote 8, s 81(1).

36

ConstitutionAct, supranote 30, s 92(8).

17

38

Corporation of Surrey v Peace Arch Enterprises Ltd, (1970) 74 WWR 380, 1970
CarswellBC 168. See Margaret Stephenson, "Canadian Provincial Legislative Powers
and Aboriginal Rights since Delgamuukw Can A Province Infringe Aboriginal Rights
or Title?" (2003) 8:1 Int'l Trade & Bus L Ann 57.
The Vancouver Charter, SBC 1953, c 55, s 6 specifically excludes the Musqueam
Reserve from the City, but the province has not amended the legislation to exclude the
Kitsilano Reserve.

3

Shiri Pasternak, "Property in Three Registers" Scapegoat - Architecture/Landscape
/Political Economy 00 (Fall 2010) 10, explores the possibilities of property and
sovereignty, but settles on jurisdiction in Pasternak, On Jurisdiction and Settler
Colonialism: TheAlgonquins ofBarriereLake Against the FederalLand ClaimsPolicy
(PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, Department of Geography, 2013) at 3
[unpublished].
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helpful, and I use it when considering the extent and limits of
decision-making authority, my starting point is the property-status of
Indian reserves. The history of the Kitsilano Reserve as a property interest,
and understood as a delegation of sovereignty to the False Creek Indian
Band, reveals not only its changing character as a state-delegated interest,
but also the shifting position of Indian reserves in the relationship between
Indigenous peoples and the state.
II. DELEGATED SOVEREIGNTY
The traditional territories ofthe Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh
Coast Salish peoples include what is now the City of Vancouver. 0 The
Musqueam, their winter village on the north arm of the Fraser River, the
Squamish, whose winter villages occupied the lower reaches of the
Squamish River at the head of Howe Sound, and the Tsleil-Waututh on the
north shore ofBurrard Inlet, moved in and through the spaces that came to
be known as English Bay, False Creek, and Burrard Inlet. These spaces were
seasonally important resource procurement sites. The rivers draining into
the bay and inlets supported annual salmon runs; shellfish and other sea life
flourished on the tidal flats.
European explorers and cartographers surveyed the area in the late
eighteenth century, visits that are reflected in the names that adorn the
prominent geographic features. In 1821, the British Crown granted the
Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) a trading monopoly over the vast Oregon
Country, and in 1827 the HBC established a trading post at Fort Langley,
about 50 kilometres up the Fraser River. It was the first permanent
European presence in the region and became a new focal point for
Indigenous economies. The European presence would be felt in other ways
as well, including successive and devastating waves of contagious disease

4

The principal historical and anthropological works include: Wayne Suttles, CoastSalish
Essays (Vancouver: Talon Books, 1987); Wayne Suttles, "Central Coast Salish" in
Wayne Suttles, ed, The Handbook ofNorth American Indians:Northwest Coastvol7
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1990) 453; Susan Roy, These Mysterious
People: Shaping History and Archaeology in a Northwest Coast Community
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).
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that dramatically reduced Indigenous populations.41 However, newcomers
were hardly present through the first half of the nineteenth century in the
space that would become Vancouver, even as their commercial and
microbial presence in the broader region precipitated massive change.4 1
In 1858, the British established the mainland colony of British
Columbia with its capital at New Westminster to forestall possible
American annexation as thousands of gold-seekers from California poured
up the Fraser River. The new arrivals bypassed English Bay and Burrard
Inlet in the rush for gold, but in the early 1860s, timber and the building of
a water-powered sawmill drew the first permanent non-Indigenous
population to the area. The mills brought ships, and BC lumber began
moving through an emerging port, first to local markets, and then around
the Pacific. The first land survey around the inlet, conducted in 1863,
marked off several townsites, a number ofgovernment and military reserves,
and a few private lots that confirmed prior pre-emptions. Most of the
private lots were heavily timbered, speculative acquisitions, and the
townsites were little more than industrial camps, but the telegraph reached
the colonial capital at New Westminster in 1865, and four years later was
extended to Burrard Inlet. The region had entered the ambit of
Anglo-American capital and British colonial rule.43

It was in the context of these emerging resource extraction industries
and growing Anglo-American settlement, superimposed on age-old
Indigenous settlements, that the colonial state began to construct an Indian
reserve geography. In Making Native Space, Cole Harris has revealed its
4'

Robert Boyd, The Comingof the Spirit ofPestilence: IntroducedInfectious Diseases
and Population Decline among Northwest Coast Indians, 1774-1874 (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 1999); Cole Harris, The Reserlement of British Columbia: Essays on
Colonialism and GeographicalChange (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) at 3.

42

Cole Harris, "The Lower Mainland,

1820-81" in Graeme Wynn & Timothy Oke, eds,
Vancouver and Its Region (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992) 38.

On these developments, see FW Howay, "Early Settlement on Burrard Inlet" (1937) 1
BCHQ 101; FW Howay, "Early Shipping in Burrard Inlet, 1863-1870" (1937) 1
BCHQ3; Bruce Macdonald, Vancouver: A Visual History(Vancouver: Talon Books,
1992) [B Macdonald, Vancouver] at 14-17. For a particular focus on False Creek, see
Robert K Burkinshaw, False Creek: History, Images, andResearchSources(Vancouver:
City of Vancouver Archives, 1984).
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imperial context, the details of implementation, and some of the responses
to it.4 The result, much different than elsewhere in North America, was a
territory divided between small, scattered parcels ofland that were set aside
as Indian reserve and the remaining land that was available to immigrants
and industrial capital. The division was not an equal one; slightly more than
one third of one percent of the Province's land area became Indian
reserves.45 The reserves would be the "Indian" spaces within a province
where the preponderance of land would be available to others.
The Kitsilano Reserve fit within this larger Indian reserve geography. It
included the Coast Salish village known to the Squamish as Sen'ikw and to
the Musqueam as san'a?q, a seasonal settlement occupied in late spring to
harvest sea life moving in and out of the small inlet.46 The reserve first
appeared on a surveyor's map in 1869 as a 37. 4 5-acre parcel of forested
land.47The allotment date is uncertain, but it is likely the survey confirmed
an earlier allotment, probably in 1863 when it appears that the colonial
government under GovernorJames Douglas also allotted a 165-acre reserve
at the mouth of the Capilano River (Capilano No. 5).41 Over the next

"

Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British
Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002) [C Harris, MakingNative Space].

45

See ibid at 261. Much of the explanation for the Indian reserve geography in British
Columbia lies in the connection between reserved land and the fisheries. See Douglas C
Harris, Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves and Fishing Rights in British
Columbia, 1849-1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).

6

For recollections and accounts of the village, see Lee Maracle, "Goodbye Snauq" in
Tantoo Cardinal & Tomson Highway, eds, Our Story: AboriginalVoices on Canada's
Past(Toronto: Doubleday, 2004) 205; Jean Barman, "Erasing Indigenous Indigeneity in
Vancouver" (2007) 155:1 BC Studies 3 at 5-11.

4

See Survey Plan, JB Launders, September 1869, and recorded in the British Columbia
Gazette (27 November 1869).

"

The first 37.45 acres of False Creek No 6 was "(s)et aside by Governor Douglas B.C.
Crown Colony": Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Schedule of Indian
Reserves in the Dominion of Canada, Part 2 Reserves in the Province of British
Columbia,prepared by the Indian Affairs Branch, recompiled and corrected up to 31
March 1943, online: Library and Archives Canada <www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng
/Pages/home.aspx> at 554. See also Lillian Ford & Cole Harris, "BC Colonial Indian
Reserves" (April 1999) [unpublished, archived at UBC Rare Books & Special
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several years, the colonial government either allotted or confirmed the
earlier allotment of several other reserves on Burrard Inlet-at the site of
the Anglican mission (Mission No. 1), the mouth of the Seymour River
(Seymour Creek No. 2), and another parcel a little further east (Burrard
Inlet No. 3)-and the Musqueam Reserve at the mouth of the Fraser River
(Figure 3). Derived in a moment of imperial expansion and colonial
settlement, this was the initial land base for Indigenous peoples around
what would become the City of Vancouver.

Figure 3 Indian Reserves allotted by the Colony of British Columbia in the 1860s
and the Joint Indian Reserve Commission (JIRC) in 1876.

Collections, SPAM22210] at 16-18 (for details on archival sources for the New
Westminster District colonial reserves).
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The Indian reserve geography was imposed. It was not part of a
discussion of Aboriginal title or negotiations leading toward treaties to
establish the terms ofco-existence between Indigenous peoples and a settler
society. It appeared that these discussions might come when, in 1871,
British Columbia joined the Canadian Confederation and, under the Terms
of Union, 9 ceded jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians" to the federal Parliament.so However, British Columbia refused to
entertain discussions of Aboriginal title or treaty making. Provincial
officials were convinced that the colonial land policies, as reconfigured
under Commissioner ofLands and WorksJoseph Trutch when he assumed
responsibility in 1864, were sufficient to meet the needs of the
Indigenous inhabitants.
Instead of a treaty-makingprocess, the governments ofBritish Columbia
and Canada concocted the Joint Indian Reserve Commission (JIRC) as the
vehicle to deliver British Columbia's particular Indian reserve geography.51
Initially comprised of three commissioners accompanied by a census taker,
the JIRC began its work in November 1876 and turned first to the
Musqueam and Squamish communities at the mouth of the Fraser River
and around Burrard Inlet. The record of Commissioner Alexander
Caulfield Anderson on the day the JIRC visited the Kitsilano Reserve
reveals the Commission's earliest workings and provides a sense of the
bureaucracy that was beginning to envelop the lives of Indigenous peoples.
False Creek - The Chief (

) is absent at Howe Sound, where we shall

probably see him. Sketch of the original Reserve produced by his substitute.

Comprising acres, and signedJ.W. Trutch C.C.S.&W 1869. This Reserve is
heavily wooded, as a whole, but with partially cleared patches. Adjoining
the house of the Chief is a well-fenced garden, of about an acre or more, in

49

British Columbia Terms of Union, 1871 (UK), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II,
No 10, Schedule, s 13.

5o

Constitution Act, supra note 30, s 91(24). I use "federal" or "Canada" throughout
rather than "Dominion", although the later was more common until after World War II,
and it is only with the CanadaAct, 1982, the "Dominion of Canada" is shortened
to Canada.
See C Harris, Making Native Space, supranote 44 at 73-103.
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which were growing thirty apple trees, Rasp-berries, Strawberries & other
fruit, with cabbages and other vegetables-the whole in very good order.

The Inds. did not care for any extension of their Reserve backward, where
the winds are very [illegible], but wished to have a little more frontage on
the water. We accordingly extended the western boundary till it strikes the
water; an insignificant extension as [illegible] acreage; but valuable for the
purposes of the Inds., and comparatively indeed all the land so available in
the vicinity.52
This would prove a typical encounter. The reserve commissioners
reviewed what land had already been set aside as reserve, and asked what
additional land might be wanted. They evaluated the existingland base and
requests for additional lands in relation to the number of inhabitants, their
use of the land, the extent and quality of available land, and the
commissioners' sense of future needs to accommodate settlers. At False
Creek, the census-taker recorded 42 inhabitants: 15 male and 15 female
adults, and 3 male and 9 female children. He also noted eight acres of
partially cleared land, three-quarters of an acre cultivated as a garden, and
livestock (2 horses, 50 fowl, and 7 geese)51 This was the state's accounting
of a group it labelled the False Creek Band, Squamish Tribe, and its
property. On the basis of this visit, the commissioners recommended a
doubling of the Kitsilano Reserve, although the new land was not to
include its timber value, which had already been granted in a timber lease.51

52

Diary of AC Anderson (14 November 1876), Victoria, Royal BC Museum and
Archives (MS-0559, vol 2, folder 5) [blanks as in original].

53

Indian Superintendent James Lenihan to Deputy, Minister ofthe Interior, EA Meredith
(10 June 1877), Library and Archives Canada ["LAC"], Indian Affairs (RG 10, vol
3650, file 8424 (reel C-10 114). See also Barman, supra note 46 at 8-11; Cole Harris,
"How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire" (2004) 94:1
Ann Assoc Am Geogr 165 (on the power of this accounting).

54

Joint Indian Reserve Commission, Federal Collection of the Minutes of Decision,
Correspondence, and Sketches, vol 3, page 142, Minute ofDecision, Squamish IRNo 6,
Kitsilano: "Original reserve confirmed and increased running true north from the north
west post to sea thence following shore line to north east post of original reserve.
Addition subject to rights of timber lessee." Many years later, J.S. Matthews, the future
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The tidiness of the census numbers and reserve acreages covered over a
great deal, including the disputes between Indigenous peoples that were an
inevitable result of the parsimonious reserve allotments. In fact, the
commissioners cautioned Indian Affairs that it might expect difficulties in
the region.55 The Squamish were notorious for the independence of their
villages and the exclusivity ofownership. The commissioners appear to have
intended that the reserve allotments might steer the Squamish towards a
form of communal ownership, something that would happen in 1923 when
the Squamish tribes amalgamated. The caution also alluded to tension
between the Squamish and Musqueam over which had the better claim to
the land around English Bay. One of the commissioners, Gilbert Malcolm
Sproat, recounted views that the Squamish had only established residences
in the region when the lumber mills offered the possibility ofwage labour.56
But whatever the history ofsettlement, the reserve commissioners recorded
the reserves around English Bay as Squamish reserves, and the False Creek
Band members as the inhabitants of the Kitsilano Reserve.
PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY

An 1880 survey defined an 80-acre Kitsilano Reserve, the southern half of
which had been allotted by the colonial government in the 1860s, the
northern halfby theJIRC in 1876. Territorially, this would be the reserve at
City Archivist and prominent advocate that the Kitsilano Reserve become a city park,
would claim that the JIRC's doubling of the reserve acreage raised "the question of the
morality, perhaps the legality, of increasing the size of the Indian Reserve," and that it
justified paying less for the reserve than it might otherwise be worth. He continued: "In
that period of land grabbing, it would seem that the commission had little justification
for taking crown lands of B.C. in such a location, and transferring them to Indians, who
had already more than they were using, or ever used." (JS Matthews to City Clerk (3
June 1931), City of Vancouver Archives ["CVA"] (1 12-D-4, file 1).)

55

56

Alex C Anderson, Arch McKinley, and GM Sproat tojames Lenihan, Superintendent of
Indian Affairs, (17 November 1876), LAC Indian Affairs (RG 10, vol 3639, file 7380
(reel C-101 12)).
Sproat to Minster of the Interior (27 November 1876), LAC, Indian Affairs (RG 10,vol
3611, file 3756-7 (reel C-10106)). See Andrew Parnaby, "'The Best Men That Ever
Worked the Lumber': Aboriginal Longshoremen on Burrard Inlet, BC, 1863-1939"
(2006) 87:1 Can Hist Rev 53.

2017

PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY

339

its largest. Another six acres would be added in the 1920s when the inlet
was dredged and the material deposited on the northern point to extend
the reserve, but by then other parts of the reserve had been excised for
a railway.
If, following Cohen, one understands property rights as delegations of
sovereign power, then Indian reserves were unusual delegations. The Indian
Act, 1876, passed by the federal parliament to consolidate earlier Indian
legislation, defined a reserve as "any tract or tracts of land set apart by treaty
or otherwise for the use or benefit of or granted to a particular band of
Indians, ofwhich legal title is in the Crown."17 As a result, the delegation of
sovereignty was partial. Canada retained the legal interest, allotting the
beneficial interest to the bands, and placing responsibility for "the
control and management of the reserves" with the emerging bureaucracy
for governing Indigenous peoples-the Department of Indian Affairs."
Moreover, Indian bands, not individuals, held the beneficial interest. Indian
Affairs could allot interests within a reserve by issuing "location tickets",, to
band members that established individual rights to possession and use of
particular lots.60 Punishment for trespass on reserve land included arrest and
incarceration. 6 1 Finally, the Indian Act, 1876 provided that reserve land
could not be alienated until it had been surrendered to the Crown with the
Indian band's consent.62 In sum, the state constructed a particular form of
collective ownership when it allotted Indian reserves, distributing the
beneficial interest to Indian bands while retaining the legal interest and
63
placing the responsibility in its bureaucracy to act as trustee. In Cohen's
6
The Indian Act, 1876,37-39 Vict, c 18, s 3( ) [Indian Act, 1876].

5

5

Ibid, s 2.
9

60

Ibid, s 7.
Ibid, ss 5-10. On the history of location tickets and their evolution into certificates of
possession, see Tom Flanagan, Christopher Alcantara, & Andr6 Le Dressay, Beyond the
Indian Act: Restoring Aboriginal Property Rights (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010) at 57-70.

61

Ibid, ss 11-17.

62

Ibid, ss 25-26.

63

See Bartlett, supra note 29 at 72-86 (on the different judicial characterizations of
Indian reserves as property interests).
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terms, the reserves amounted to a divided or partial delegation of
sovereignty. What was not yet clear in 1880, when the Kitsilano Reserve
was surveyed, was just how robust that delegated interest would be.
However, to focus on reserves as property interests should not
obscure the state's failure in British Columbia to address the issue of
Aboriginal title or, more broadly, Indigenous sovereignty. The capacity of
the state to displace Indigenous sovereignty with a proclamation of its
own- "sovereignty's alchemy"6-finds its territorial expression in British
Columbia through an imposed "Indian Land Policy" that dealt in property
interests, not Aboriginal title.65 No matter the extent to which the state
might delegate sovereignty in the grant of property interests, it would
always be delegated and thus revocable.66 Moreover, the principal effect of
the reserve grants, which defined the spaces from which members of a
settler society were excluded, was to confirm that the remaining territory in
the Province would open to the people and capital of that settler society. In
the late nineteenth century, a settler society with a voracious appetite for
land pushed aside Indigenous peoples in British Columbia whose
populations were at their nadir.67 In this legal and social context, even the
small parcels of land set aside as Indian reserve were vulnerable, and the
reduction of the Kitsilano Reserve began soon after its allotment with the
arrival, in 1886, of the transcontinental railway and the incorporation of
the City of Vancouver.

'

Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy', supranote 15.

6

On the history of Aboriginal title in British Columbia, see Hamar Foster, "Letting Go
the Bone: The Idea of Indian Title in British Columbia" in Hamar Foster & John
McLaren, eds, Essays in the HistoryofCanadianLaw, Vol 6, British Columbia and the
Yukon (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1995) 28.

66

The existence of Aboriginal title after St. Catherine'sMilling, was also understood as
"dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign": supra note 9 at 54.

6

John Douglas Belshaw, BecomingBritishColumbia:A PopulationHistory(Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2009).
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III. DIMINISHING SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LOSS
OF PROPERTY
The lumber industry brought significant change to Burrard Inlet, but the
transcontinental railway would utterly transform it, and would begin the
dismantling of the Kitsilano Reserve. The Pacific terminus of Canada's
transcontinental railway was originally set for the eastern end of Burrard
Inlet, but the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) coveted a more westerly
terminus and, in 1885, reached an agreement with the Province to extend
the line twenty kilometres in exchange for 6,275 acres of land (Figure 4).61
The following year, the few white residents incorporated the City
of Vancouver to establish a local government for managing the
railway-induced building boom, and the first train arrived in 1887.69
The provincial land grant stipulated that the CPR terminus was to be at
Coal Harbour and English Bay, but these sites were on either side of a
peninsula and presented different options for the port. CPR officials
appeared to prefer English Bay and sought additional land from the federal
government, including the Kitsilano Reserve and a government reserve
further to the west. In 1886, CPR vice-president and general manager W.C.
Van Horne believed he had the prime minister's consent to acquire the
Indian reserve. 70

61

For a recent account, see Frank Leonard, "'So Much Bumph': CPR Terminus Travails at
Vancouver, 1884-89" (2010) 166:1 BC Studies 7.

6

70

On the influence of the CPR on the development of Vancouver, see Norbert
MacDonald, "The Canadian Pacific Railway and Vancouver's Development to 1900"
(1977) 35:1 BC Studies 3; Robert AJ McDonald, "City-Buildingin the Canadian West:
A Case Study of Economic Growth in Early Vancouver, 1886-1893" (1979) 43:1 BC
Studies 3; Robert AJ McDonald, Making Vancouver: Class, Status, and Social
Boundaries, 1863-1913 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996) 35-45.
Sir William Van Horne fonds, LetterbookNo 14 (Oct 1885-Jan 1886), WC Van Horne
memorandum toJC Abbott (4January 1886), LAC.

342

UBC LAW REVIEW

VOL 50:2

Government Grant to
CPR, Feb. 1885 - two trac

BC

62 75 acres (2,539 2h1a)
Pivate lots - 1/3 donated
to CPR, Sept 1885

Figure 4 CPR Land Grant, 1885, and Railway Line. The CPR crossed False Creek
and built its line through the Kitsilano Reserve in 1886 without securing prior
permission from either the Crown or the False Creek Indian Band. (Source: Based
on a map in Frank Leonard, "'So Much Bumph': CPR Terminus Travails at
Vancouver, 1884-89" (2010) 166:1 BC Studies 7 at 13.)

The purported consent was important. Federally incorporated railways
held power, under The ConsolidatedRailwayAct, 1879 (the RailwayAct),
to expropriate property from private owners so long as that property was
"necessary for the construction, maintenance, accommodation and use of
the railway".71 Several title holders along the line from Port Moody to

71

The ConsolidatedRailway Act, 1879,42 Vict, c 9, s 7(2) [Railway Act, 1879].
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Vancouver attempted to stop the CPR from expropriatingland to build the
extension, but in 1886 the SCC confirmed that the company could proceed
without their consent.72 However, in the case of Crown land, there was no
right of expropriation: a railway company could "use or occupy any lands
vested in Her Majesty" if it were necessary for the railway, but only with
consent. 3 And even with consent, the legislation only allowed a railway
company to use, "but not alienate," that land.7 4 In other words, when a
railway company acquired Crown land under the RailwayAct, it did so on
the condition that it use the land for its railway. Moreover, whether private
or Crown land, railway companies had to provide plans to demonstrate that
the land was "necessary" for their railway operations and, on the basis of
these plans, secure a certificate from the Minister of Railways "declaring it
to be necessary in the public interest that the land shewn on such plan, or
any less quantity, should be acquired by the Company."71
Ifa railway company were to expropriate private property, or use Crown
land with consent, then it had to pay compensation and the railway statutes
contained provisions for arbitration ifthere were disagreements over value.71
These statutes provided little direction about the appropriate metric for
compensation, but did include language of "fair compensation."77 Another
provision indicated that any increase in the value of remaining land that
resulted from the construction of the railway might be subtracted from the
compensation owed for land taken.71 The general expectation and practice
seems to have been that owners, either private or Crown, receive the
exchange or market value.
What about Indian reserves? Under the Indian Act, 1876, the Crown
held the legal interest in Indian reserves-it retained title-but held that
interest "for the use or benefit of' the band to which a reserve had been
72

Canada Pacific Railway Co v Major (1886),

7

Railway Act, 1879, supranote 71, s7(3).

74

Ibid.

78

Ibid, s 11.
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Ibid, ss 9(10)-(36).

n7 Ibid, s 9(12).
71

Ibid, s 9(18).

13 SCR 233, 1886 CarswellBC 2.
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allotted." In brief, the Crown held reserve land in the form of a trust for
Indian bands. As part of this trust relationship, the Crown had to secure an
Indian band's consent for the surrender of a reserve before the land could be
alienated to third parties.s0 These surrender with consent provisions,
although weakened by statutory amendment in the late nineteenth and first
half of the twentieth century, provided the basic statutory protection for
Indian reserves." However, the IndianAct, 1876included a provision that
enabled railways to circumvent these statutory protections:
31. If any railway, road, or public work passes through or causes injury to
any reserve belonging to or in possession of any band of Indians, or if any
act occasioning damage to any reserve be done under the authority of any
Act of Parliament, or of the legislature of any province, compensation shall
be made to them therefor in the same manner as is provided with respect to
the lands or rights of other persons.... 8 2
Under this provision, and a similar one in the Railway Act, 187983 the
surrender with consent provisions did not apply if a railway company
needed reserve land for its railway and was authorized by statute to acquire
it. The RailwayAct, 1879 provided that authority, but with qualifications.
Because the Crown held legal title to the reserves, railway companies
needed the Crown's consent to occupy reserve land. It was the Crown that
did not need to secure the band's consent. As a result, so far as Indian bands
were concerned, railway companies might take reserves without their
consent; but, so far as a railway company was concerned, it needed the
Crown's consent. Moreover, even with that consent, railway companies
could use, "but not alienate" Crown lands.14 In terms of compensation,
when a railway passed through or caused damage to reserve lands it had to
pay compensation to the band on the same terms as it did for other land.
7

IndianAct, 1876, supra note 57, s 3(6).

80

Ibid ss 25-26; The Indian Act, 1880, SC 1880, c 28, ss 36-37 [Indian Act, 1880].

8

See Darlene Johnston, The TakingofIndian Lands in Canada: Consenror Coercion?
(University of Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre, 1989) at 62-89.
Indian Act, 1876, supra note 57, s 20; Indian Act, 1880, supranote 80, s 31.

12

8

RailwayAct, 1879, supranote71, s 9(37).
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In March 1886, the CPR submitted plans to the Department of
Railways ("Railways") that showed tracks crossing False Creek and dividing
the Kitsdano Reserve in two." The company may have already built the line
across the reserve when it submitted the plans, but if not, it did so soon
afterwards, and without seeking or securing anyone's consent. The
company owned most of the south shore of False Creek (Figure 4), the
crossing was short and the inlet shallow, and the CPR might have landed
anywhere within its block. Instead, the CPR chose to bisect the much
smaller parcel of reserve land and the reason was soon clear. In June 1886,
the CPR delivered an arbitration notice under the Railway Act to Indian
Affairs announcing that it required "the whole of the Indian Reserve on the
South Side of False Creek" and that it would pay $1,800 for the
80-acre parcel.86
Indian Affairs sent officials to investigate. They reported that the
residents were leading"a comfortable existence" derived from employment
in the lumber mills. Moreover, the members of the False Creek Band were
"loyal and exceedingly well disposed, and on this account their claims are all
the greater for a proper protection of their rights." 1 However, it was clear
from Chief Chepwhaim's statement that the CPR was threatening
those rights:
I am glad to see you, I know you come as our friend, and all my people
welcome you, I have heard you speak and these are our words to you. We do
not wish to prevent the railway from entering and passing through our
land, and we are willing that the Company should have right of way. They
now own every thing here, but why do they wish to take, after they have
come on to our land, the little we have left. It is not long since we were told
by the Queen's Reserve Commissioners, that they would keep for us
(confirm) the land set aside many years ago-they added as much more
which, they told us, would be ours forever. Does the Queen wish to give us
land in order to make our hearts sick by allowing it to be taken away from
85

86

8

Drinkwater to AP Bradley (11 March 1886), LAC, Department ofRailways and Canals
(RG 43-A-I-2, vol 204, file 475, pt 1).
H Abbot to IW Powell (1 June 1886), LAC, Indian Affairs (RG 10, vol 7674, file
22167-5B (reel C- 11615)). See Leonard, supranote 68 at 22-26.
Ibid, IW Powell to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (18 June 1886).
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us afterwards. We are weak, there are only a few of us, but the Queen is
strong and can do what she likes. We can only ask you to protect us. We
cannot defend ourselves. It was the Queen's heart to treat us well (justly)
when we received her promise that this land would always be kept for us.
Does she wish to break her word and take all our land back, I cannot think
this, or you would not be here. We want you to write strongly about this
land it is our home-our ancestors are buried here. We are willing to let the
railroad pass through our land, but not more. We hope you can protect
us-My people implore you to do this-We wish to cultivate this land and
to look upon it as the home of ourselves and our children who come
after us."
Indian Superintendent Powell described other speeches as "of similar
import', and noted "that the Railway Company have been working on the
reserve for some time and the road is already graded through it.""As for the
CPR's offer of $ 1800 for the 80-acre reserve, he indicated that the company
had been selling land within the townsite on the peninsula at prices of
$10,000-$15,000 per acre. Land in the government reserve on English Bay,
a few kilometres to the west of the Indian reserve and thus further from the
emerging commercial centre, had sold at a public auction for an average
price of $600 per acre. The sum of $1800 for the 80 reserve-acres-a mere
$22.50 per acre-was "absurdly nominal"; $750 per acre ($60,000 for the
parcel) was a reasonable valuation "if the rights of the Indians are to be
considered on the same basis as those of other land owners."9o
Senior officials within Indian Affairs agreed, including Prime Minister
and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs John A. Macdonald, who
instructed the department "to protect Indian interests & to prevent if
possible the acquisition by the CPR of the Reserve."91 Indian Affairs
informed the departments of Railways andJustice that it did not consent to

88

Ibid.

89

Ibid.

90 Ibid.
9'

Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs L Vankoughnet toJA Macdonald (3
July 1886), LAC, Indian Affairs (RG 10, vol 7674, file 22167-5, pt 1 (reel C- 11614));
margin notes from JA Macdonald (5 July 1886).
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the expropriation of the whole reserve.9 2 For its part, the Department of
Justice provided an opinion confirming that the CPR could only obtain the
reserve with the consent of the government and that compensation had to
be paid "in the same manner as is provided with respect to the lands or
rights of other persons"'3
The CPRwas undeterred. The next iteration ofits application included
an elaborate plan depicting four massive docks jutting out into English Bay
from the Kitsilano Reserve, which was covered with tracks, workshops, and
a roundhouse.94 Historian Frank Leonard suggests the proposal replicated a
Chicago-like scale for the rail yards and revealed the drawings as little more
than a "fanciful plan."9 Internal CPR correspondence also noted the site's
challenges: "[t]he ground is really a very difficult one on which to place our
shops, it being so uneven and the grades & cuttings so heavy."96 Moreover,
the company's general manager, Van Home, confided he "never thought we
would be able to make our principal yard there," but nonetheless told the
engineers "to lay in a sufficient number of temporary tracks for immediate
purposes until the question of the expropriation of the Indian Reserve is
settled. As soon as that question is out of the way, we can lay out and go
ahead with our whole scheme."" Even with these apparent weaknesses, the
Department of Railways concluded that the terminus plan was "no more
than sufficient for their requirements,"" and within a month the minister
issued the required declaration under the RailwaysAct"that it is necessary

92

LVankoughnet to TTrudeau (8July 1886), LAC, Department of Railways and Canals
(RG 43-A-I-2, vol 204, file 475, pt 1); L Vankoughnet to GW Burbidge (8 July 1886),
LAC, Department ofJustice (RG 13-A-2, vol 2249, file 1886-63 (old file 1886-69)).

9

Department ofJustice to L Vankoughnet (17July 1886), LAC, Department ofJustice
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in the public interest" for the CPR to use the Kitsilano Reserve for its
railway operations."
Indian Affairs suspected the CPR intended to subdivide and sell the
reserve as the company was doing with most of the False Creek tract. 0 It
pushed back one more time, the minister writing to the Minister of
Railways that the reserve "could only be surrendered by consent of the
Indians themselves.",'o, This was wrong in law. The CPR needed the
Crown's consent to occupy reserve land, as the opinion from the
Department ofJustice confirmed, but the Crown did not need the band's
consent. However, the issue became moot when the newly incorporated
City of Vancouver intervened with a 30-year tax concession on a 75-acre
parcel of CPR land to induce the company to locate its rail yard,
roundhouse, and shops on the north shore of False Creek.102 At this point,
the CPR appears to have discarded the scheme for a port in English Bay. It
did retain the right-of-way across the Kitsilano Reserve, but ran only one
train across it before abandoning the track and the trestle bridge.
Even if unsuccessful, the CPR's efforts to acquire the Kitsilano Reserve
appear to have prompted Parliament to amend the IndianAct in 1888 to
make the need for the government's consent more explicit:
46. No portion of any reserve shall be taken for the purposes of any railway,
road, or public work without the consent ofthe Governorin Council, and,
if any railway, road, or public work passes through or causes injury to any
reserve, or, if any act occasioning damage to any reserve is done under the
authority of an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province,
compensation shall be made therefor to the Indians ofthe band in the same
manner as is provided with respect to the lands or rights ofother persons.'
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JH Pope, Minister of Railways & Canals (31 January 1888), LAC, Department of
Railways and Canals (RG 43-A-I-2, vol 204, file 475, pt 1).
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The object of the amendment, explained government leader of the Senate
J.C.C. Abbott (also a director of the CPR and a future prime minister), was
"to prevent railway companies claiming and takingunder the expropriation
clauses of the Act more land than is necessary for the purposes of the
railway."'0 In 1888, Parliament inserted a similar provision in the
Railway Act.os
In 1895, nine years after the CPRhad graded the rail bed and laid tracks
through the Kitsilano Reserve, neither Indian Affairs nor Railways seemed
to know exactly how much land had been taken or whether the False Creek
Band had been compensated. Indian Affairs requested an accounting from
the CPR, and received a reply that the company had taken a 99-foot-wide
strip of land (the maximum width allowed under the Railway Act)
amounting to 3.52 acres with "merely nominal" or "no marketable value."s6
Indian agent Frank Devlin estimated that the land was "worth in the
neighbourhood of about $200.00 per acre."07 Indian Affairs reviewed the
earlier correspondence, including Indian superintendent Powell's much
higher estimate of $750/acre, but stuck to Devlin's $200/acre figure. The
CPR sought an evaluation from a notary, who provided an opinion that the
land was not worth more than $20/acre before Vancouver was announced
as the terminus.os The company argued that it had created the value in the
land and therefore ought not to pay for that value. However, this was an
104
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untenable position; the legislation directed that value was to be determined
at the time the land was taken, not before the terminus had been
announced. InJune 1899, the CPR sent a cheque for $704 to Indian Affairs
for the 3.52 acres of right-of-way (based on $200/acre).'*
The CPR right-of-way bifurcated the Kitsilano Reserve (Figure 5), but
this was only the beginning of its dismemberment. In early 1900, a CPR
subsidiary, the Vancouver & Lulu Island Railway Co. ("V&LI Railway"),
began work on a line heading south, from False Creek to the Fraser River.110
The president of the new company wrote to Indian Affairs to inform the
department that it would take a triangle-shaped, seven-acre parcel from the
Kitsilano Reserve to connect the line to the existing CPR right-of-way
(Figure 5), "provided no objection is made by you on behalf of the
Indians.""' Indian Affairs did not appear to take notice, and the railway
company continued its work ofsurveying and grading on the reserve. When
the V&LI Railway wrote again about the land in 1901, Indian
superintendent Vowell indicated "[e]ntry should never be made on any
Indian reserve without the necessary authority for the act having first been
obtained through the regular channels" and demanded an explanation from
the Indian agent for "why it was that the Company were allowed to enter
on the reserve at False Creek without having first obtained permission,
through this office, as is usual in all such cases.","I Vowell was correct; the
railway company needed the consent of the Governor in Council
(effectively the federal government) before occupying Crown land,
including Indian reserves. The V&LI Railway president responded that the
company had occupied the reserve the year before without advising Indian
Affairs "in the same way as land is usually occupied by Railway Companies"
and that a plan had been deposited with the Lands and Works Department
109
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in Victoria, "which is usually considered sufficient notice to property
owners.""' In this, the company was treating the reserve as it would a
private parcel.
In May 1901, any pretence that the V&LI was a separate entity from the
CPR abandoned, the CPR submitted its survey of the Kitsilano Reserve
with certification from Railways that the 7-acre triangle (V&LI
right-of-way) was "necessary for the proper working of the Railway."114
Indian Affairs consented to the sale, something it had never done for the
earlier right-of-way."5

In turn, the federal government

issued an

order-in-council approving the transfer.16 The IndianAct did not require
the consent of the band, and it does not appear to have been sought.117
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Figure 5 Survey of the Kitsilano Indian Reserve showing the CPR Right-of-Way
(1886) cutting across the reserve and the addition of 7 acres to connect with the
Vancouver & Lulu Island Railway line (1901). (Source: Vancouver & Lulu Island
Ry., Right of way through Ind. Reserve, Vancouver B.C., HM Burwell, surveyor
(22 December 1900), LAC, Department ofTransport (RG 12, vol 1884, file 326896, pt 1).)
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Discussion turned to the appropriate compensation. The V&LI Railway
president had indicated that the company was prepared to pay the same
price that the CPR had paid for the earlier right-of-way and he expected
this would satisfy Indian Affairs.11 The Indian agent suggested the land was
now worth $1500-$1800 per acre,111 but Indian Affairs wrote to the CPR
indicating that it would accept $500 per acre, or $3500 for the seven-acre
right-of-way, a sum the CPR paid promptly without objection.120 The
federal government granted title by issuing letters patent, which the CPR
registered in the land title office in 1902.
In the ordinary course of land transactions, title flows in one direction,
consideration in the other. However, the transactions involving the
Kitsilano Reserve were not ordinary. The first complication involved title.
Although British Columbia had agreed under the terms of union with
Canada in 1871 that "[t]he charge of the Indians, and the trusteeship and
management of the lands for their use and benefit, shall be assumed by the
Dominion Government", the Province refused to follow through with the
transfer of administration and control over Indian reserves."z' It claimed a
reversionary interest to the land, insisting that if Indian reserve status were
revoked, then the land reverted to the Province. Furthermore, it delayed
conveying control over Indian reserve lands to Canada until 1938 in order
to protect this reversionary interest.1 22 But in 1902, when the federal
government purported to issue title for the 7-acre parcel to the CPR, the
land was still formally under the administration and control of the
Province. Nonetheless, all the parties seemed to accept that it was for the
federal government to issue title, even if the Province had not formally
transferred control, and the Province's land title office accepted Canada's
"
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grant as evidence of title and listed the CPR as the holder of the fee
simple interest.
However, the 3.5-acre right-of-way, for which the CPR had paid $704
in 1899, remained Indian reserve; the Crown had never issued title to the
railway company. In 1925, the CPR sought to rectify this, indicating to
Indian Affairs that it had paid "an exceedingly high price" for the land and
that it was not satisfied in what it understood as the federal government's
initial offer to transfer the "Indian interest in the lands comprised within
the right-of-way."23At this point, the federal government demurred, seeking
first to resolve matters with the Province before issuing a title grant. In
1927, Canada and the Province settled on $350,000 as the value of the
Province's claim to the Kitsilano Reserve. In corresponding
orders-in-council, the Province transferred "all the right [,] title and interest
of the Crown in the Right of the Province of British Columbia,
reversionary or otherwise, in the Kitsilano Indian Reserve No. 6... to the
Crown in right of the Dominion of Canada",4 and Canada agreed to pay
$350,000.125 At this point, it appears that Canada issued letters patent to the
CPR for the right-of-way and that the company registered its interest in the
land title office. A re-survey of the parcel had revealed that the CPR
occupied 3.62 acres, or an extra tenth of an acre, so it paid an additional $45
($20 for the additional acreage plus interest).26

The other complication involved the nature of the interest acquired. It
appears that the federal government intended to issue, and the CPR
thought it had acquired, an unconditional freehold interest in the two
parcels. It is less clear how they understood that this had occurred. The
RailwayAct, under which the transactions were conducted, stipulated that
railway companies could use "but not alienate" Crown lands, a clear
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prohibition on unconditional transfers.127 One possible explanation is that
the parties assumed An Act respectingthe Canadian PacificRailway (the
CPR Act) applied to the transaction. 2 The CPR Act and the agreement
between the government and the company for the building of the
transcontinental railway (the CPR Contract), which was annexed to the
legislation, stipulated that granted land was to become the "absolute
property" of the company.1 29 However, the CPR relied on and used the
processes set out in the RailwayAct, not the CPR Actor CPR Contract, to
acquire the parcels from the Kitsilano Reserve. Although the parties may
have intended that the CPR would acquire an unconditional freehold
interest, the instruments they used only permitted the issue of property
interests in land to the extent that the land was necessary and used for the
operation of the railway. Nonetheless, the CPRwas eventually listed in the
provincial land registry as the holder of two unconditional freehold
interests over 10.5 acres that had been part of the Kitsilano Reserve.
PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY

Common law property lawyers frequently pronounce that property is a
relative concept and that disputes over property interests in land are
resolved by determining who has the better claim, not who has absolute
title.no Within this realm of relative title, Indian reserves, as one form of
property, enjoy certain protections against competing claims. The most
important are the surrender and consent provisions in the Indian Act:
reserve status can only be surrendered with an Indian Band's consent.
However, when railway companies challenged Indian reserves in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, seeking to acquire land for their
operations, the surrender with consent provisions did not apply. There were
still protections for Indian reserves in law-notably the need for Crown
consent before a railway company could take reserve land and the
127
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requirement that Indian bands be compensated for taken land-but the
Crown had delegated a diminished sovereignty when Indian bands
confronted railway interests. The CPR's acquisition of portions of the
Kitsilano Reserve is one example of the heightened vulnerability of reserve
land in the face of those interests."'
The vulnerability was compounded by the federal government's failure
to enforce what protections did exist. When the CPR decided to take land
from the Kitsilano Reserve, the legal obstacles proved inconsequential.
First, the company was required to secure the Crown's consent before
taking land from an Indian reserve. Instead of securing that prior consent,
the CPR simply entered, surveyed, and graded the reserve, and then
laid track. The Crown would eventually provide that consent by
order-in-council in 1902 for the seven-acre V&LI right-of-way, but it never
provided formal consent for the acquisition of the 3.5-acre CPR
right-of-way until Canada purported to issue title in 1927, even though the
Province had not yet transferred administration and control.' The
legislation required prior consent, the CPR occupied the land without
consent, and the federal government either provided its consent after the
fact or not at all. It made no attempt to remedy what was, without Crown
consent, unlawful occupation. Second, reserves were also protected by the
requirement for compensation, and in this they were to be treated the same
as privately-held land-title holders were to receive "fair compensation.
For the 10.5 acres of the Kitsilano Reserve, the CPR paid, and the
government accepted, well below what its officials considered the exchange
value. This was particularly damaging, not only because the False Creek
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Band received relatively little for their land, but also because in
circumstances where land could be taken without consent, the
compensation requirement provided its principal protection. The failure to
secure "fair compensation" invited further taking.
Singer's attentiveness to the differential application of legal categories
when applied to Aboriginal interests, and the resulting propensity to
diminish or discount those interests, resonates here.113 In fact, the early
dismemberment of the Kitsilano Reserve reveals not only the weakness of
legal protections for reserve land, but also the failure of law. Where
Canadian law required that reserve land be treated differently than private
property (Crown consent before transfer) it was treated the same, and
where reserve land was to be treated the same as private property ("fair
compensation"), it was treated differently. Both failures diminished the
status of the Kitsilano Reserve as a property interest and as a delegation
of sovereignty.
THE END OF PROPERTY

IV.

Between the second railway cut-off in 1901 and the eventual surrender of
what remained in 1947, the members of the False Creek Indian Band were
shunted off the Kitsilano Reserve, and then the reserve itselfwas gradually
reduced to make space for industry, for the military, and for city streets.
Where parcels of land were taken for public purposes, the issue was not
whether the reserve land could be taken, but rather the appropriate
compensation. Agreement was elusive, and judges often made the final
determination in reviewing the results of arbitration. Those decisions
appear to have significantly undervalued the land, but the withering of
other protections meant that the compensation requirement served as the
principal shield for the Kitsilano Reserve through the early decades of the
twentieth century, particularly in the face of the City of Vancouver's
repeated attempts to be gifted the land for a park. For much of the period,
uncertainty about the nature and extent of the Province's interest and, as a
consequence, ambiguity about jurisdiction, meant that most of the reserve
remained unused even as it was being divided up.
133
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The first formal expression of the City's interest in the reserve appears
in an 1899 council resolution calling on Canada to grant the reserve to the
City and move the False Creek Band to another Squamish reserve.' City
council passed a similar resolution in 1901,135 and the provincial legislature
joined the following year with a resolution calling on the provincial
government to work the federal government to remove the band members
"on fair and equitable terms.""' A group described as "prominent business

men of the city" were also pushing for the government to relocate the band
and to acquire the reserve as the City's exhibition ground.17 The City's
finance committee recommended a $500/acre offer for the 70 acres of the
reserve, the same sum that the CPR had paid for the seven-acre V&LI
right-of-way.11 However, the False Creek Band was not inclined to sell.
Several years later, Indian Agent McDonald reported that the band
members "were unanimously opposed" to a sale; the reserve was "their
home where they were born and brought-up, and where their fathers and
grandfathers had lived," and "their dead relatives for generations past are
buried there and they are unconditionally opposed to removing or
disturbing their remains.""9
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Figure 6 Map showing the Kitsilano Reserve bounded by Chestnut Street to the
west, First Avenue to the south, and the various cut-offs including the CPR,
V&LIR, and Burrard Bridge rights-of-way, and the Department of National
Defence Armoury. Note the narrowing of the Burrard Bridge right-of-way where it
crosses CPR land. (Source: Based on survey ofthe Kitsilano Reserve, GF Foundain,
surveyor (8 July 1930, CVA (112-E-1 file 9); Plan of Pipe Line Right-of-Way, JR
Burnes, surveyor (13 October 1937), ILRS, Kitsilano No 6, "Licence of
Occupation", 1 March 1938.)
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Although opposed to the sale of the reserve, the False Creek Band did
appear willing to lease portions for industrial use. In 1904, the Rat Portage
Lumber Company (also the Harrison River Timber & Trading Company)
applied to acquire the 11-acre parcel of the reserve that lay between the
railway and False Creek (Figure 6) and the male members of the band
consented to a 50-year lease at a price of$200/year, as well as funds to build
fences and houses, and compensation for the loss of fruit trees.140 Later that
year the band surrendered the 11 acres, and in 1905, Indian Affairs
concluded an agreement with the company on the terms as set out in band
council resolution, with an additional provision allowing the federal
department to terminate the contract with one year's notice if the reserve
were sold. 1
The City's efforts to acquire the Kitsilano Reserve subsided, but the
Province's purchase in 1911 of the Songhees Reserve in Victoria's inner
harbour revitalized talk of a similar acquisition in Vancouver. Parliament
passed an act to confirm the transfer of the Songhees reserve,"' and it also
amended the Indian Act to make it simpler for municipalities to acquire
Indian reserves within their boundaries. The amendments recognized the
capacity of "any company or municipal or local authority" with statutory
expropriation power to exercise that power over Indian reserves. 4 The
taking of reserve land still required the federal government's consent, but
the amendments legitimized municipal taking of reserve land. Moreover, a
new section provided that where a reserve lay within, or adjoining a town or
city with a population of at least 8,000, the municipality might refer to a
judge "the question as to whether it is expedient, having regard to the
interest of the public and of the Indians of the band for whose use the
reserve is held, that the Indians should be removed from the reserve or any
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Indian Land Registry System [ILRS], registration #80009, Kitsilano No 6, Lease, 12
May 1905 [with False Creek Indians Band resolution, 22 March 1904, attached].
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September 1904.
An Act respecting the Songhees Indian Reserve, SC 1911, c 24.
IndianAct, RSC 1906, c 81, s46 [Indian Act, 1906], as amended bySC 1911, c 1 4 , s 1.
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part of it." 1" If the judge were to determine that removing the Indians was
"expedient," and if Parliament were to concur, then the land would be sold
or leased by public auction and the proceeds, plus any compensation for
"special loss" in relation to buildings or other improvements, would be paid
1
to the Indians, or used to acquire a new reserve. 4
The amendments to the Indian Act constructed Indian reserves as in
some senses more similar to, and in others, more different from private
property. The existing provision (section 46) meant that land taken for
railways, roads, and public works did not require Indian band consent, and

the amendment added any statute-authorized taking by a company,
municipality or local authority to the list of exemptions. To the extent that
the amendments diminished the need for Indian band consent, they made
Indian reserves more similar to private property, which could also be taken
without consent. On the other hand, the new provision (section 49A)
created another process for the municipal taking of Indian reserves that,
although subject to judicial oversight and requiring Parliament's consent,
was in addition to whatever statutory power municipalities had to acquire
Indian reserves and was not subject to the protections for property owners
embedded in those statutes. By creating another mechanism for the taking
of Indian reserves, the amendments constructed Indian reserves as different
from private interests. Both changes weakened the protections for Indian
reserves as property interests.
Emboldened by the removal of the Songhees reserve and encouraged by
the amended Indian Act, the City of Vancouver renewed its efforts to
acquire the Kitsilano Reserve. A city delegation met with the provincial
premier inl9l 1, and then followed up with a formal application to the
Province to relinquish any reversionary claim should Canada agree to
transfer the reserve to the City. In doing so, the City set out its reasons for
wanting the land:
The City of Vancouver has little, if anything, in the nature of Public Parks
and Play Grounds within the City and is desirous of obtaining this Indian
Reserve for Parks, Play Grounds and Municipal and Civic purposes.
144
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Further the Reserve, if acquired, would form part of an extremely desirable
plan or scheme of connecting up the City proper with Kitsilano across
False Creek, providing a highway for Marine Drive on the Point
Grey Road.' 6
Although it was far from certain at the time, this description of the City's
plan for the reserve, including thoroughfare and park, presages the
eventual result.
In 1912, the Province decided it would proceed alone to eliminate the
reserve. It did not inform Indian Affairs, apparently hoping to avoid the
federal department's intervention. Attorney General WilliamJ. Bowser set
aside $300,000 and appointed stipendiary magistrate H.O. Alexander to
lead negotiations with the False Creek Band. The prospect of a significant
land transfer and rumours of large sums of money attracted a number of
other players who sought to insert themselves into the land deal. These
intermediaries used a combination of bluster, threat, and deception to
induce the members of the False Creek Band to deal their reserve. This
included claims that the recently appointed Royal Commission on Indian
Reserves for the Province of British Columbia (the McKenna-McBride
Commission) could confiscate reserve land without compensation, and that
only the Province would pay the band members directly for the land. 1 The
latter was accurate; Indian Affairs would place the funds from any sale in a
trust account for the benefit of the Squamish Indian Band as a whole, not
just the False Creek Band. And given the history of land dealings in the
Province, the threat that the McKenna-McBride Commission might take
the land was plausible enough to create a sense amongband members that if
they were to benefit directly from the transfer of land, then the deal needed
to be concluded quickly.48
146
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Under pressure from multiple sources, in March 1913, some ofthe False
Creek Band signed an agreement giving the Province an option to acquire
the reserve on the payment of $11,250 to each male head of family, $1000
to move the remains of their ancestors, and expenses to cover moving their
possessions to another Squamish reserve. A tense month followed the
signing, with other more substantial private offers mooted, but not
confirmed. Eventually, Attorney General Bowser intervened, inserting
himselfdirectly into the negotiations, and threatening that unless the band
members accepted the Province's offer, they would receive nothing. At one
meeting he is reported to have "suddenly interrupted" one of the Indian
speakers, who raised a competing offer, and "exclaimed sharply":
When the commissioners have gone you will get nothing at all for your
land, not one cent. All you will get will be a portion of land somewhere in
the Squamish Valley in return for the Kitsilano reserve. Now which do you
prefer, $11,250 or nothing? Here is your cheque. If you want it you can
take it and draw your money for the land; or you can leave it. 9
Editorial comment in at least one newspaper thought the Province's
tactics inappropriate:
Property rights must not be invaded, no matter who the owner of those
rights might be. The reserves were given to the Indians by the Federal
Government, and in governmental relations to them, and in the sustaining
or asserting of those relations, the honor of the Dominion and the British
race is at stake.5 0
Honour notwithstanding, the deal was concluded within the week.'"
The False Creek Band packed up and left the reserve on 9 April 1913,
towed on a barge with their belongings and the remains of their ancestors
to a Squamish reserve up Howe Sound (Figure 7).
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Figure 7 Members of the False Creek Indian Band gathered on a scow, waiting for
the high tide and to be towed to a Squamish reserve up Howe Sound, 9 April 1913.

(Source: Image PNO8924 courtesy of the Royal BC Museum and Archives)

Attorney General Bowser celebrated the removal of "an eyesore to the
citizens ofVancouver",152 but questions about the legality of the transaction
and reminders that the federal government still had to approve it surfaced
immediately.53 H.H. Stevens, the Member of Parliament from Vancouver
and Federal Minister of the Interior, called the deal "regrettable"and
indicated that the government's consent was far from certain. 4 Local
officials in Indian Affairs, then within Stevens' department, claimed not to
152
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have known about the deal until it was announced in the newspapers."'
This is incredible given the flurry of newspaper stories in early April, but
the Province had purposefully excluded Indian Affairs from the
negotiations. The department insisted that although Parliament had
amended the IndianAcrto allow municipalities to acquire Indian reserves
without the consent of the resident Indian band, the sale still had to be
ratified by Parliament.,,'
Parliament did not ratify the transfer of the Kitsilano Reserve. The
Province's $300,000 had secured the removal of the False Creek Band, but
not the elimination of the reserve. This would lead, in 1916, to a special
committee of the provincial legislature to investigate the transaction. After
hearing from 11 witnesses over 16 meetings, the committee confirmed that
band members had received only $219,750 of the $300,000 that the
Province had allocated for the transaction. This amounted to $3139/acre
for the 70 acres, a sum that was considerably more than the $500/acre that
the CPRhad paid in 1901, but the Inspector of Indian Agencies for British
Columbia, W.E. Ditchburn, considered it inadequate: "[t]he amount paid
to the Indians in consideration of their giving up their reserve ($219,750)
appears to be extremely small so far as land value in that portion of the City
of Vancouver are concerned." '15What of the remaining funds? The special
committee found that $79,050 had been divided between the Province's
lead negotiator H.O. Alexander and lawyer Hamilton Read, who drafted
the documents and who appears to have been one of the principal agitators
fomenting fear and urgency among the False Creek Band to conclude the
deal. However, the special committee discovered no impropriety in the 36
percent commission for Alexander and Read: "the said purchase by the
Province and the removal of the Indians from the said reserve was of great
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public benefit and was conducted in a fair and proper manner, and that the
purchase price was reasonable.",s5
Jean Barman describes the removal ofthe Kitsilano Reserve residents as
part ofthe erasure of Indigenous indigeneity from Vancouver.5 Indigenous
people remained in Vancouver, but the City had embarked on a process to
eliminate their distinctness, their indigeneity. However, this required more
than just removing the members ofone Indian band; it required eradicating
the spaces in which Indigenous peoples had distinct status and identity, and
over which the City and the Province had no direct control. The
Indigenous presence was one thing, the absence of jurisdiction created by
the Indian reserve status another, and although the False Creek Band was
gone, the indigeneity of the property interest endured, at least for a time.
In 1914, the Vancouver Harbour Commissioners applied to acquire the
Kitsilano Reserve. The McKenna-McBride Commission, then in the
middle of its deliberations and having the power to grant interim orders,
approved the request subject to "the requirements of the law and to due
compensation" for the Squamish and the Province.60 The Harbour
Commissioners offered $500,000, the federal government assessed the land
at $1,250,000, and the dispute went to arbitrators who valued the land at
$666,200.16, The federal government appealed the decision to the British
Columbia Supreme Court, which overturned the arbitrators' award, and
.. British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Journalsofthe Legislative Assembly ofBritish
Columbia, 13th Parl, 4th Sess, Vol 45 (31 May 1916) at 172-173. See also British
Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Special Committee to Investigate the Purchase of the
Kitsilano Reserve, Evidence and Proceedings (Victoria, BC, 1916). More than 30 years
after the transaction, Hamilton Read also provided a statement regarding its details to
RR Holland in which he explained that the smaller sum of $5000 was paid to two boys
whose mother was a Band member, but presumably whose father was not. CVA, PAM

1945-54 (22 October 1945).
15

Barman, supra note 46 at 15-20. See also Renisa Mawani, "Genealogies of the Land:
Aboriginality, Law, and Territory in Vancouver's Stanley Park" (2005) 14:3 Soc & Leg

Stud 315.
160 British Columbia, Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British
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Columbia, Interim Report No 82 (Victoria, BC:1916) at 112.
In the Matter of the Expropriationofthe Kitsilano Indian Reserve (23 January 1917),
CVA (1 12-D-5 file 3) (Arbitrators: CE Mahon,Jas Borland, and Alfred M Pound).
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that decision was upheld in the BC Court of Appeal.' During the legal
proceedings, the Harbour Commissioners increased their offer to
$750,000, which officials within Indian Affairs seemed prepared to accept.
However, the transaction stalled over disagreement between the provincial
and federal governments over the value of the Province's interest.' 3
In the ensuing years, the Harbour Commissioners lost interest in the
reserve, choosing to focus instead on the port in Burrard Inlet, but the City
still coveted the land. Continuing uncertainty over the extent of the
province's interest remained a barrier to any transfer of title until late 1927
when the province agreed to limit its claim in the value of its interest to
$350,000. At this point, the Squamish also agreed to surrender the reserve,
and in doing so recognized that the province would have a first charge
against the land for the sum of $350,000, with the remainder of sale
proceeds to the Squamish.'1"In early 1928, the province and Canada passed
corresponding orders-in-council agreeing to settle the province's claim for
$350,000.161 It is not clear how the two levels of government settled on this
figure, but it seems likely that the province was attempting to recover the
$300,000 that it had paid to the members of the False Creek Band.
As this agreement concluded, the province disclosed that since 1924 it
had been receiving rent from the Rat Portage Lumber Company for the
same land that the False Creek Band had agreed to lease to the company in
1905 (Figure 6). Under the earlier agreement, the Squamish were receiving
$200/year; under the later agreement, the province was receiving $3235.5 6
for the first 5 years and $4960.75 for the next sixteen.1 66 Officials within
Indian Affairs expressed astonishment that the province thought it could
collect rent for reserve land,67 and beginning in 1928 the company paid the
162
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rent to the department. The Squamish passed two resolutions calling for
the province to transfer the rent-$ 12,942.24-that it had collected under
the first four years of the agreement to the Band.'6
Once the parties had agreed to the value of the province's interest,
negotiations shifted to the sum that would be paid for the reserve. The
Squamish, by band council resolution in 1929, granted the City a
12-month window to purchase that reserve for $750,000, of which
$350,000 would go to settle the province's claim once the Squamish had
received $400,000.169 For its part, the City wanted to be gifted the land. It
had commissioned a prominent American city-planning firm, Bartholomew
and Associates, to produce a city plan, and that plan marked the Kitsilano
Reserve as park.17o The City made several overtures to the province, asking
that it waive its claim for $350,000. The province declined,,", Indian Affairs
backed the Squamish in their insistence on a reasonable sum for the land,
and the City demurred at the asking price. A newspaper editorial captured
the thinking behind the City's insistence that it should be given the land:
Now, as to the equity of the Indians. The Kitsilano reserves consists of
about 80 acres. It is worth a lot of money-one valuation places it at
$700,000. But who gave it that value? The Indians? The idea is absurd. The
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people of Canada? Only in a minor degree. Practically all the value the
reserve has been given it by the people ofVancouver, who have built homes
and done business east, west and south of the area, who have run streets to
its boundaries and transportation through it. Other property in the city has
increased in value as much as the reserve has, or more. But it has paid
regular contributions to the city during forty years. The Kitsilano Reserve
has increased in value through the efforts of the people of Vancouver and
has paid nothing. The Indians may have an equity in the Kitsilano Reserve.
The Dominion Government, as their guardian, and representing the
people of all Canada, may have an interest and an equity. But the equity
of neither can in any way compare with the equity of the people
of Vancouver.1 72
Whatever claim the Squamish might have to the reserve, suggested the
editorial, they were not responsible for, and therefore deserving of, its value.
The Squamish, backed by Indian Affairs, refused to give the land away,
but the piecemeal dismembering of the Kitsilano Reserve continued. The
1929 city plan included a motor vehicle crossing of False Creek between
downtown and the adjoining neighbourhood of Kitsilano through the
reserve, 73 and in 1930 the city set about acquiring a bridge right-of-way
under the IndianAct provision that allowed the taking of reserve lands for
public purposes. 74 Canada consented and issued two orders-in-council to
approve the expropriation ofthree parcels amounting to slightly more than
8 acres of the reserve (Figure 6).17
Once again, Indian Affairs and the City could not agree on the
appropriate compensation, so that matter went to arbitration. Two of the
three arbitrators-the City appointee and the chair-determined that the
land was worth $44,988.58 (including a deduction for the benefit accruing
to the remaining reserve) and ordered that Indian Affairs bear the costs of
the arbitration, perhaps because the sum awarded was less than the $49,600
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that the City had offered.171 Canada's appointee did not sign the decision,
and the local Indian Agent described the decision as "another fiasco.",Indian Affairs appealed to the British Columbia Supreme Court, arguing
among other things that the arbitrators had improperly considered city
zoning in determining the value of the land because the City had no
jurisdiction, but the court dismissed the appeal.-* The Department
appeared ready for a further appeal, but the Squamish put a stop to it.17 Of
the $44,988.58 award, $15,145.65 was deducted to cover the City's legal
costs, and Indian Affairs had expended $13,708.85 in fighting the award. A
paltry $16,314.06 was deposited into the trust account that Indian Affairs
managed for the Squamish, and another 8 acres of the reserve were gone.
The survey that accompanied the Burrard Bridge expropriation
application is revealing. The bridge right-of-way is 120 feet wide through
the reserve, but narrows to 80 feet when it intersects the earlier CPR
right-of-way, and then expands to 160 feet when it re-enters the reserve
(Figure 6). According to a City Memorandum written in preparation for
the appeal, the CPR granted the City the bridge right-of-way over its earlier
railway right-of-way at no charge.so Given how vigorously the CPRpursued
its interests elsewhere in the City, it is doubtful that the CPR acquired no
benefit in allowing the bridge right-of-way, but even if it did not receive
consideration, there is no aspect of the bridge's structure that might explain
the narrowing of the right-of-way through the CPR lands. Instead, it
reflected the perception that while private property was to be protected,
reserve land was expendable.

76 The Vancouver DailyProvince (19 September 1932) 1; JB Williams, City Solicitor, to

City Finance Committee (21 September 1932), CVA (1 12-D-5 file 3).
"' FJC Ball to CC Perry (19 September 1932), LAC, Indian Affairs (RG 10, C-II-2, vol
11,078, file 167/34-7-6).
171 In Re Arbitration between Department of Indian Affairs and City of Vancouver,
Vancouver (BCSC) (9 December 1932), CVA.
"7 Ibid, Andy Paull, Secretary Squamish Band, to HH Stevens, Minister of Trade and
Commerce [nd].
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In 1934, the Department of National Defence (National Defence)
applied for land at the south end of the Kitsilano Reserve to build an
armoury. Indian Affairs appraised the land at $7,500/acre and the federal
government transferred the parcel to National Defence by order-in-council
(Figure 6).111 Shortly thereafter, the City engineer informed National
Defence that unless it provided a strip of land along 1st Avenue to widen
the street to the standard width and conform with the city grid, the City
would not consider improving the street."' National Defence agreed to
move its 4-acre parcel slightly to the north, and it paid Indian Affairs for
the additional 0.285 of an acre that it would take from the reserve
(Figure 6).m11
The land taken for the armoury would be the last fee simple interest
excised from the Kitsilano Reserve without the direct consent of the
Squamish Council. Although the provisions in the IndianActhad not been
changed, and reserve land could still be taken without a band's consent by a
municipality or other entity with expropriating authority, the fact that it
was not marks a substantial change in the nature ofthe reserve as a property
interest. The armoury parcel would also be the last parcel alienated from
the reserve before the Squamish would formally surrender the reserve in
1947. To this point, nearly 23 acres had been removed from the reserve
(10.5 acres to the CPR, 8 acres to the City for the Burrard Bridge, and 4
acres to National Defence for the armoury), for which the Squamish had
received $66,204.43.184
The selling ofparcels of the Kitsilano Reserve ceased, but Indian Affairs
continued to conclude short-term leases. In 1934, it leased a small parcel for
3 years to an advertising company to erect billboards on either side of the
Burrard Bridge right-of-way for $780/year (Figure 6). " It also concluded a
5-year lease, at $5040/year, for two small parcels ofwaterfront land, located
1

PC 1934-1913 (23 August 1934), pursuant to Indian Act, 1927, supranote 174, s 48.
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on either side of the CPR right-of-way where it met False Creek, to make
space for what was described in the agreement as "a fuel, timber and
wharfage business."16 Then in 1938, the Greater Vancouver Water District
(GVWD) acquired a perpetual easement (described in the agreement as a
"licence of occupation") to run an underground pipeline across the reserve
for $125/year.17 Indian Affairs does not appear to have sought out or
received Squamish consent for these transfers, but there is no indication
that the Squamish objected. The Kitsilano Reserve would be used as a
source of revenue.
Those portions of the Kitsilano Reserve that had not been alienated or
leased existed in a strange limbo. The False Creek Band had been moved
off, Indian Affairs took little interest in the land, and neither the province
nor the city had authority over it. The City still coveted the Kitsilano
Reserve as a park, and in the early 1930s its beaches had become popular
among city residents (Figure 8). This image of the Kitsilano Reserve acting
as a city park, with the recently constructed Burrard Bridge in the
background, reflects the City's longstanding hopes for the land. However, a
few years later, as the effects of the economic depression mounted, that
same landscape was covered with squatters' shacks (Figures 12 and 13). The
City lacked jurisdiction, Indian Affairs lacked interest, and squatters moved
into the vacuum, establishing a small community at the entrance to
False Creek.-
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rigure a rieacn-goers on tne snore or tne &itsuano rnatan reserve wirn tne newly
completed Burrard Street Bridge in the background, c. 1932. (Source: City
ofVancouver Archives (AM54-S4-: Park N9.6))

Figure 9 Photograph from the Burrard Street Bridge of the northern portion of
the Kitsilano Indian reserve, c. 1935. The open area that beach-goers had enjoyed a
few years earlier is now covered with squatters' shacks. (Source: City ofVancouver
Archives (AM54-S4-: Park N 10.2))
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Figure 10 Photograph from the Burrard Street Bridge of the southern portion of
the Kitsilano Indian Reserve with squatters' shacks perched on the foreshore either
side of the CPR trestle bridge. The Armoury is just visible in the central distance.
(Source: Vancouver Public Library, H.W.R. photo, No. 13177)

The squatters, and the unkempt reserve in a prominent and highly
visible location, pre-occupied city officials. In what Jordan Stanger-Ross
describes as an effort of "municipal colonialism"' the City, led by its Park
Board, waged a campaign to remove the squatters, clear the reserve of its
brush, and realize the several decades old vision of the land as a public
park.'1' As a first step, the City secured funds from Canada to pay for the
work. Wary ofmunicipal intentions, Indian Affairs indicated that it would
not accede to any activity on the reserve without Squamish consent.' This
insistence on consent was a new development and, given the consistent
willingness of the department in preceding decades to transfer portions of
the reserve without Squamish consent, amounted to a significant change in
"
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approach. To this point, the principal brake on municipal desires had been
the requirement to compensate for taken land, not consent. Now Indian
Affairs appeared to be insisting on consent. The law had not changed; the
Indian Act still enabled a municipality to rely on the Crown's consent.
What appeared to be changingwas the perception within Indian Affairs of
the nature of the Indian reserve as property.
To assuage concerns, the Park Board conceded that in clearing the
reserve, it was not also making claims to the reserve."' In 1937, the
Squamish Council approved the clean up, but reiterated its insistence that
the City had to purchase the land before it could be used as public park.91
At this point, provincial and city officials evicted the squatters, burned their
structures, and removed the brush, but, despite earlier assurances, the Park
Board was soon seeking public access to the reserve for nominal rent and
Indian Affairs, in reply, was reminding the local officials of their
commitment not to allow public use of the reserve until it had
been purchased."9
World War II interrupted the efforts of the Park Board to acquire the
reserve and precipitated two leases to the Department ofNational Defence
for most ofwhat remained. In 1939, National Defence requested a five-acre
parcel adjacent to the existing armoury. Indian Affairs responded
immediately, reiterating the need for Squamish consent even in wartime: "It
will be necessary to obtain the consent of the Indians to lease the lands
involved, but difficulty in this respect is not anticipated." 19 The lease
extended for the duration of the war plus one year, and annual rent was set
at 5 percent of the land's value (using the $7500/acre paid several years
earlier for the armoury site to determine that value). This would have
resulted in an annual rent of $1875, but the Indian Agent reported: "The
191
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Indians have reduced this to $1500.00, the difference being their
contribution to the country's war expenditures."5 The Squamish
attempted to make a similar, tangible contribution to the war effort when
the council approved a second lease to National Defence several years later,
this time for the nearly 42 acres of reserve land north of the CPR right-ofway. Annual rent was set at $5000 for the duration of the war plus three
years, but the Squamish indicated a $2000 deduction for the first year "to
be contributed to the Government's war effort as a donation from the
Squamish Indian Tribe.""' The donation violated the permitted uses for
Indian band funds and was not included in a second resolution or in the
final agreement.19 7
In between these National Defence leases, Indian Affairs received an
inquiry from a shipbuilding company about leasing the reserve north ofthe
CPR right-of-way for $12,000/year.9 The Squamish council approved this
lease in principle-no formal offer had been made-and in early 1941,
Vancouver papers reported that a shipbuilding company had acquired the
reserve.199 This erroneous announcement provoked a chorus of opposing
voices from the Park Board and groups labelling themselves the Vancouver
Tourist Association and the Associated Property Owners ofVancouver, all
ofwhich passed resolutions on 1 Ojanuary opposing the lease.200 The Indian
commissioner suggested the opposition to shipbuilding was spurious cover
for a fear that a lease, which reflected the value of the land, would make it
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more difficult for the City to acquire the land as park. In the penultimate
sentence he wrote:
The right of the Indians to this reserve is sacred, and the right of their
trustees to use these lands for the use and benefit of the Indians can not be
successfully challenged. 201
Indian Affairs did have a responsibility to act in the best interests of the
Squamish when dealing with reserve land. However, the shipbuilding
company never made a formal offer, perhaps because of the opposition, and
some months later National Defence leased the same land at much-reduced
rent. The City was not pleased with the new tenant, but deigned to
sanction it anyway, provoking an unusually sarcastic response from Indian
Affairs-"It is, of course, gratifying to learn that the City authorities are
prepared to permit this Department to negotiate with the Department of
National Defence with a view to leasing part of the Kitsilano Indian
Reserve for war purposes"-and a stern reminder that it was not the
City's business.202
After the war, the federal government moved quickly to secure what had
long been anticipated: the surrender of the Kitsilano Reserve. The
Squamish council consented, but on the conditions that the subsequent sale
recoup at least $600,000 and that to satisfy the first claim against these
funds, the federal government agree to pay the province $350,000 to settle
its claim.203 Once the federal government had satisfied itself that it could
recover at least $600,000 from selling the land, it paid the province, and the
province transferred administration and control.204 At this point, the federal
205
government formally accepted the surrender of the remaining 64 acres.
Squamish Indian Reserve No. 6-Kitsilano ceased to exist, at least for
the moment.
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Figure 11 Aerial photograph of the City of Vancouver, c. 1957, with white line
showing the former boundaries of the Kitsilano Indian Reserve. Large Department
of National Defence buildings occupy the area to the north of the Burrard Street
bridge. (Source: City of Vancouver Archives (COV-S62-: CVA 296-37))

The reserve had been surrendered for sale, and the process ofselling the
land and depositing the funds in the Squamish trust account began
immediately. On the same day that the federal government accepted the
surrender, National Defence acquired the nearly 42 acres of reserve to the
north of the Burrard Bridge and CPR rights-of-way.zo6 The following year,
Central Mortgage and Housing acquired slightly more than 8 acres adjacent
to the armoury and the Bridge.207 In 1955, Federal Department of Public
Works acquired a four-acre parcel on the waterfront where it constructed a
wharf and harbour for a small fishing fleet, and a private entity purchased
206
207
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just over two acres where it built rental accommodation. In 1959, another
private entity acquired six acres, and finally a sawmill acquired an adjacent
two-acre parcel in 1965.Just over 64 acres (all that remained of the reserve
at the time of its surrender) had been sold for a little more than $1
million.20s Then in 1966, the land no longer needed for national defence,
Canada gifted the northern half of the former reserve to the City in the
form of a 99-year lease for $1/year. The following year, the City opened
Vanier Park, thus accomplishing a goal first articulated by City Council
resolution in 1899.209 Much of what had been the Kitsilano Reserve was,
and is, a public park, which the City acquired for free.
PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY

The delegations of sovereignty through which a state allots property
interests are always incomplete. The state establishes limits and withholds
certain powers, one of the most important ofwhich is the capacity to set the
terms under which it may take those interests. Constitutional protections
for property, where they exist, commonly constrain but do not eliminate
this capacity. In Canada, the constraints on the state's capacity to
expropriate property interests are statutory, not constitutiona.210 So it was
that in 1911 Parliament amended the Indian Act to enable municipalities
to bypass the surrender with consent provisions that protected Indian
reserves. Municipalities could now take Indian reserve land without a
band's consent, but they still required the federal government's consent.
This proved important when the province of British Columbia attempted
to purchase the Kitsilano Reserve directly from the False Creek Band. The
federal government refused its consent, and the land remained Indian
reserve. However, it was quite prepared to oversee the dismemberment of
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the Kitsilano Reserve for industry, the military, and roadways. After
stripping the need for band consent, the principal constraint on the taking
of reserve land was the requirement to pay compensation. In this, Indian
reserves had become more like private property, except when it came to
assessing land values. The record reveals much disagreement over the value
of the Kitsilano Reserve, frequent use of arbitration and the courts to
establish that value, and continuing lamentations from the Squamish and
officials within Indian Affairs about the repeated undervaluing of reserve
land. Compensation was the principal bulwark against taking Indian
reserve land, but the under-valuing of that land diminished its effectiveness.
However, there appears to be a shift within the Department of Indian
Affairs in the latter half of the 1930s when it started to insist on securing
Squamish consent for all transactions involving the Kitsilano Reserve. This
shift was not the result of an amendment to the Indian Acr or connected to
a judicial ruling, but rather reflected a new determination within the
department to bolster the protection for Indian reserves. The source for this
change in approach is unclear, but it appeared when nobody expected that
the Kitsilano Reserve would remain Indian reserve. The issue had become
securing the best return for the disposition of real estate.
The City of Vancouver wanted the Kitsilano Reserve land for a park,
but part of the explanation for the intensity of its effort to acquire the
parcel lay not in its desire to establish that particular use, but in its lack of
capacity to determine the land use. In this regard, understanding Indian
reserves not only as a property interests, but also as delegations of
sovereignty is a useful reminder that reserve status has sovereign effects
within Canadian federalism. Reserve-status vacates much ofthe jurisdiction
of the Province and the City, particularly in relation to the regulation of
land use. It was the reserve as a jurisdictional island, separate and apart from
the principal object ofmunicipal regulation-land use-that prevented the
City from intervening on its own accord when, through neglect, the reserve
became what City leaders deemed an embarrassing eyesore. Civic leaders
not only wanted a park; they wanted to remove the Indians and the hole in
the City's jurisdiction that the reserve, as a particular delegation of
sovereign power, created. In this they succeeded, but only for a time.
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RESILIENT PROPERTY AND THE RISE OF SOVEREIGNTY

V.

Who owns land at the south end of the Burrard Street Bridge in Vancouver,
211
British Columbia, known as the Kits Wye?
This deceptively simple question, the opening sentence from the decision of
Madam Justice Saunders in the British Columbia Supreme Court, frames
the land dispute between the Canadian Pacific Ltd. (formerly the CPR),
Canada, and the Squamish, Musqueam, and Tsleil-Waututh Nations, as an
ordinary property dispute. The list of litigants suggests otherwise. At issue
were the two parcels, amounting to 10.5 acres, which the CPR had taken
from the Kitsilano Reserve. In 1989, Canadian Pacific Ltd. (CP) listed the
parcels for sale. Within months, Canada filed court action for a declaration
that the land should revert to Canada because it was no longer needed for
the railway. In turn, the Squamish commenced claims against CP that the
land should revert to Canada, and against Canada that it should hold the
land as Indian reserve in trust for the Squamish. A court order joined the
actions in 1991,212 and another in 1993 joined further actions by the
Musqueam and Tsleil-Waututh First Nations against CP and Canada. This
was clearly no ordinary dispute over ownership, and it was not the only
litigation involving former Kitsilano Reserve lands.
In 1977, the Squamish had begun an earlier action against Canada in
the Federal Court, claiming that the government had breached its fiduciary
duty to manage the Kitsilano Reserve in the best interests of the First
Nation. An amended statement of claim in 1981 precipitated a process,
eventually involving Musqueam and Tsleil-Waututh claims as well, that
would lead to 200 days of hearings and a ruling from the Federal Court in
200 1.213 Between the trial and Madam Justice Simpson's decision, Canada
and the Squamish agreed to a financial settlement that resolved the
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Squamish claim against Canada.14 As a result, Justice Simpson's decision
focused on the Musqueam claim that the reserve should have been allotted
to Musqueam"2 1 and the Tsleil-Waututh (formerly the Burrard Band within
the Squamish Nation) claim that they were entitled to a share ofthe reserve,
or the proceeds from its sale, when they left the Squamish.216
In 2000,Justice Saunders in the British Columbia Supreme Court ruled
that the 10.5 acres should revert to Canada in trust as Indian reserve. 2 17 The
CPR had acquired the reserve land under the Railway Act, which enabled
railway companies to possess Crown lands for railway purposes, with the
government's consent,"' but did not allow them to alienate that land. As a
result, grants of Crown land under the RailwayActwere conditional grants
that would come to an end when the lands were no longer used for the
railway. Canada and CP appealed, but a five-panel bench in the British
Columbia Court ofAppeal upheld the trial court decision.211 The 10.5 acres
was Indian reserve again, but whose? As between First Nations, the parties
had agreed that the issue of ownership would be decided in the Federal
Court, and in 2001,Justice Simpson decided that she would not disrupt the
original grant to the Squamish.220 With these decisions, a portion of
Squamish Indian Reserve No. 6 - Kitsilano reappeared in the City of
Vancouver (Figure 12).
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Figure 12 The former boundaries (dashed line) and present boundaries (solid line)
of the Kitsilano Reserve. The Burrard Bridge right-of-way (dashed line) cuts
through the current reserve.
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The basic statutory framework constructing Indian reserves as property
interests remains largely as it was in the Indian Act, 1876. The current
IndianActvests legal title in "Her Majesty" rather than "the Crown",221 but
the former is understood as a reference to the latter.222 Where authorized by
legislation, it remains possible for provinces, cities, and corporations to take
or use reserve land with the consent ofthe federal government as authorized
by an order-in-council. Band consent is not required, and the authorizing
legislation establishes the degree of compensation. 22 3 All this is largely
unchanged from when the Kitsilano Reserve was dismantled. However, a
great deal else has changed in the field of Aboriginal law that makes the
current 10.5-acre Kitsilano Reserve a much more robust property interest
than its geographically larger predecessor. The constitutional entrenchment
of Aboriginal and treaty rights is the legal fulcrum around which those
changes have occurred.224
Indian reserves are now one among a number of Aboriginal property
interests recognized in Canadian law, including Aboriginal title. In
Delgamuukw, the S CC described Aboriginal title as a suigenerisinterest, 225
and it has since extended the suigenerischaracterization to Indian reserves
when it ruled in Osoyoos Indian Band v Oliver (Town) on the taking or
expropriation of land in 1925 from an Indian reserve in British
Columbia.226 After Osoyoos, the taking of an Indian reserve has to be
approached differently than the taking of non-reserve land for several
reasons. These included the SCC's concerns that, under the IndianAct, "an
Indian band cannot unilaterally add to or replace reserve lands,"27 and also
that there is an "important cultural component" in the relationship
between Indigenous peoples and the land which means, "the land is more
Compare IndianAct, 1876, supranote 57, s 3.6, with Indian Act, 1985, supranote 8,
s2.
222 Paul Lordon, Crown Law (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1991)
at 5.
221
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224
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ConstitutionAct, 1982, supranote 8, s 35.
Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 112.
Osoyoos Indian Band v Oliver (Town), 2001 SCC 85, [2001] 3 SCR 746.

Ibid at para45.

2017

PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY

385

than just a fungible commodity."228 Both factors work against the premise in
much of expropriation law that compensation for a taking enables the
purchase of replacement property. Indian reserves, the SCC ruled, are not
so readily replaceable. In addition, the SCC determined that the attempt to
take an Indian reserve triggers the Crown's fiduciary duty towards
Indigenous peoples. This particular duty to Indigenous peoples requires
that the Crown "fulfill the public purpose [for the taking of reserve land]
while preserving the Indian interest in the land to the greatest extent
practicable."229 As a result, establishing a public purpose for taking an Indian
reserve is only the first step; the Crown must then strive to minimize any
impairment of a First Nation's interest in achieving that purpose. Based on
Osoyoos, Indian reserves are not so readily expropriated as other
property interests.
However, not every development in the case law has strengthened the
property status of Indian reserves. Through the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the statutory provisions requiring compensation for the
taking of reserve land provided one of its principal protections. In practice,
the devaluing of Indian reserve land relative to adjacent, privately held land
weakened that protection, 2 0 and a decision by the SCC involving the
valuation of Musqueam lands confirms that the practice of under-valuing
continues."' In Musqueam Indian Band v Glass, a sharply divided SCC
discounted by 50 percent the value of residential lots in a market-based
housing development on the Musqueam Reserve because the lots were on
the reserve.- The Musqueam brought the suit in an attempt to enforce
their rights under lease agreements, as might the landlord of non-reserve
property, but the SCC used the sui generischaracterization of reserve land
to construct the land as different from and less valuable than non-reserve
land. The case raises Singer's caution of a judicial tendency to construct
Aboriginal property interests as sometimes the same as, and other times
228 Ibid at
229

para 46.
Ibidatpara 53.
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different from non-Aboriginal property interests, but in either case with the
effect of diminishing the quality of those interests."'
Moreover, the SCC has not been consistent in its characterization of
Indian reserves as property interests. Although the Indian Act appears to
create a textbook illustration of an equitable interest in land, where one
entity holds the legal interest in land for the benefit of another, in
Wewaykum Indian Bandv Canada Justice Binnie described Indian bands as
holding a "quasi-proprietary interest"3 or "quasi-property interest"213 in
reserve land, and that this was a "legal interest".236 It is a baffling
formulation, but the most plausible interpretation, consistent with the
Indian Act, is thatJustice Binnie used "legal" to describe an obligation that
is not simply "political",237 and used "quasi" as a substitute for "equitable"
rather than to indicate that Indian bands held something less than a
property interest in Indian reserves.
Nonetheless, even with this potentially destabilizing characterization of
Indian reserves as "quasi-proprietary" interests, it is almost inconceivable in
the current legal framework and political climate that the City of
Vancouver would attempt to acquire, let alone succeed in acquiring the 10.5
acres of the Kitsilano Reserve. More likely, the City would seek to influence
how the land is developed, but influence is probably as strong an authority
as the City could muster.
In declaring the presence ofAboriginal title lands in Tsilhqot'inNation
v British Columbia, the SCC reiterated that provincial laws of general
application will apply on Aboriginal title lands and that much of the
province's Forest Act could apply.238 This decision, which appears to
contemplate continuing provincial regulation of the forests on Aboriginal
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title lands, at least for some purposes, may weaken an earlier British
Columbia Court of Appeal ruling that municipalities have no capacity to
regulate land use on Indian reserves through zoning bylaws or building
codes39 However, any attempt to extend municipal authority over reserve
land would run into a similar set of constraints, created by the Crown's
fiduciary duty, that impede the municipal taking of reserve land. It is much
more likely that a city would seek to influence the development of Indian
reserve lands through agreements for the provision of municipal services,
rather than through the direct application ofmunicipal bylaws. Bearing this
out, in 2010 the City and the Squamish Nation signed a Memorandum of
Understanding and Protocol Agreement "to establish a cooperative and
government-to-government relationship" in order to address a number of
joint or mutual interests, including environmental protection, land use
24 0
planning, zoning, service delivery, and transportation. The Kitsilano
Reserve is not named, but these and other "mutual interests" will become
increasingly important to the Squamish and the City when the
re-development of the reserve begins.
In short, the unilateral taking of Indian reserve land remains a
possibility in law, but one that appears increasingly constrained by
developments in Aboriginal law since 1982. Similarly, it is well established
in Canadian law from before 1982 that the powers of municipalities to
regulate land use do not extend to Indian reserves. For both these reasons,
the current Kitsilano Reserve, although one-eighth the size of the original
reserve, is a much more robust delegation of sovereignty.
INDIAN RESERVES, PROPERTY, AND SOVEREIGNTY

The status accorded Native American tribes in the United States as
"domestic dependent nations", has established sovereignty as a
"foundational element of US Indian law".241 In Canada, the focus of
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence and scholarship has been on the proprietary
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nature of those rights; the language of sovereignty has been much less
common. There is a robust critique of the disjuncture between the courts'
effortless recognition of Crown sovereignty and their demand for proof of
Aboriginal title as a property interest, and attention to the unresolved
distribution of sovereignty is growing. 24 2 Singer's caution about the
differential application oflegal concepts warrants attention in the Canadian
context as well, although perhaps not for judicial cherry-picking between
concepts of property and sovereignty given how little the language of
sovereignty has been applied in the context of Aboriginal title."
If rare in the context of Aboriginal rights and title, the language of
sovereignty is even more unusual in the context of Indian reserves. With
few exceptions in the case law-one dissenting judgement in the British
Columbia Court ofAppeal described the tax exemption for income earned
on reserve as "consistent with the notion of Aboriginal sovereignty over
reserve lands"2"-the language of sovereignty is absent. In this, Indian
reserves, as property interests, are not unusual. Cohen's revelation was to
make the connection between sovereignty and property, between public
and private power, but the two concepts remain largely within separate
spheres ofpublic and private law. Explicit discussion of sovereignty within
property law scholarship has been rare (although is re-emerging245) and
public law scholars seldom stray below the nation state when using the
language of sovereignty. However, whatever its considerable merits in
understanding the nature and origins of private property, the concept of
sovereignty has particular salience when considering the nature of Indian
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reserves as property interests. From this history of the Kitsilano Reserve as a
property interest, I suggest three reasons.
Delegation.Indian reserves, particularly those allotted outside a treaty
framework, are state-constructed and state-delegated property interests.
They are not inherent or in any sense prior to the state, but rather are
products ofthe Canadian state's willingness to cede power to Indian bands.
As with other property interests that have their origins in a state grant, an
Indian reserve allotment is revocable under terms and conditions set out in
statute. This statutory basis provides a transparent view of the extent to
which the state is prepared to delegate power, and it also sets a standard
against which to measure the state's willingness to honour and protect its
own delegations. The history of the Kitsilano Reserve stands as an
indictment of the standard that the Canadian state set for itself to protect
Indian reserve allotments and, perhaps even more damningly, of its lack of
willingness to meet that standard. Almost as soon as the state allotted the
Kitsilano Reserve, it oversaw the beginnings ofits dismemberment to make
way for a railway, and, before too long, the removal of the people who lived
there. If property interests are understood as a delegation of sovereignty,
then the state's protection of this delegation in the case of Indian reserves
diminished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to make
room for other interests. The first signs that this trend might be reversing,
and that Indian reserves as property interests were becoming more robust,
appear in the 1930s with the renewed commitment of the Department of
Indian Affairs to seek Squamish consent before acting on the reserve.
However, it was not until the Squamish recovered a portion of the reserve
in 2002 that the resilience of the Kitsilano Reserve, as a property interest,
became fully apparent. Given the current legal framework and political
climate, the 10.5 acres of reserve reappear now as a considerably enhanced
delegation of sovereignty.
Sovereign effects. Indian reserves, as property interests, rearrange
jurisdiction within the framework of Canadian federalism. Indian reserve
status has the effect of displacing certain elements of a province s
jurisdiction over land. Although provincial laws ofgeneral application will
apply within the boundaries of an Indian reserve, land use regulation will
not. Regulating land use on reserves falls to the federal parliament, a task
that it has divided between the Department of Indian Affairs and First
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Nations themselves. This displacement ofprovincial power, which extends
to cities as creatures of provincial legislation, creates territories that are
separate and apart from the municipal jurisdiction that surrounds them.
The displacement is particular, occurring in some regulatory fields but not
others. Indian reserves are not federal enclaves. However, cities involve
themselves primarilywith the regulation ofland use, a function they cannot
perform on Indian reserves. This separateness from civic jurisdiction is the
public law dimension ofIndian reserves as property interests.2 16 Moreover, it
was this public law or sovereign dimension that animated the City of
Vancouver's drive to acquire the Kitsilano Reserve at least as much as it was
the desire for a particular land use. The City coveted a park, but also to
bring the land within the reach of its land use bylaws. As an Indian reserve,
the land was, and a portion of it now is again, beyond the City's limits.
Indigenoussovereignty. In most ofBritish Columbia, the distribution of
sovereignty between Indigenous peoples and the state is unresolved. The
Crown asserts sovereignty; Indigenous peoples claim sovereignty. The claim
to sovereignty may be put in other terms, such as jurisdiction,
self-government, inherent right, and perhaps most commonly Aboriginal
title, but the shared root of these different articulations is a challenge to the
capacity of the Crown's assertion of sovereignty to diminish Indigenous
sovereignty. Almost from its beginning, British Columbia refused to
address this challenge. Instead, it imposed a geography ofproperty interests,
using the territoriality of Indian reserves to contain the prior Indigenous
presence. The Kitsilano Reserve was part of this colonial strategy to mask
the issue of Indigenous sovereignty with the allotment ofproperty interests.
However, it was only a masking. The litigation over the Kitsilano Reserve
was presented to the courts in the late twentieth century as a property
dispute '1 but the unresolved issue of Aboriginal title lingered in the
background, threatening to destabilize the property frame just as it had
when the Indian reserve commissioners travelled the province in the late
246
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to allot Indian reserves. This is
apparent in the Musqueam claim to the Kitsilano Reserve. That challenge
to Canada and to the Squamish interest in the reserve, which involved
evidence about traditional patterns of land use and settlement that have
become common in Aboriginal title claims, lifted the property mask to
reveal the competing sovereignties just below. Indian reserves in British
Columbia are state delegations of sovereignty in a context where the claims
of Indigenous sovereignty present an unresolved challenge to the
sovereignty of the state.
Morris Cohen's characterization of private property as a delegation of
sovereignty captured something of its basic quality in the right to exclude,
but more importantly he forced a reckoning with the public origins of
private power contained in a grant of property. In one of the classic pieces
of legal realist scholarship, Cohen demanded justifications for the grant of
power.248 In this history of the Kitsilano Reserve as a property interest, I
have taken Cohen's property and sovereignty in a somewhat different
direction. My intent has not been to demand a justification for the
allotment of an Indian reserve. Rather I have probed the nature of that
property interest over time to reveal its changing character and the extent to
which the state was prepared to protect and defend this particular
delegation of sovereignty. In using the language of sovereignty, there is the
possibility that the concept becomes a little more ordinary and that
competing claims to sovereignty become a less intimidating challenge to a
conception ofnational or state sovereignty. I think this a desirable outcome,
but for those who seek greater separation between Canadian and
Indigenous jurisdiction, this domesticatingof Indigenous sovereignties may
be problematic. However, my intent has not been to diminish the character
or quality of Indigenous sovereignty, but rather to use the connected
concepts of property and sovereignty to reveal something about the
historical processes of dispossession that diminished the places and the
place of Indigenous peoples in British Columbia. We in British Columbia
need to address not only an unfair distribution of interests in land, but also

248

Joseph Singer, "Legal Realism Now" (1988) 76:2 Cal L Rev 465.

392

UBC LAW REVIEW

VOL 50:2

the inequitable sharing of sovereignty. Indeed, the project of reconciling
sovereignties remains Canada's unfinished business.

